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Problems with urbanization in China are becoming more pressing. For decades, the 
government has followed the unsustainable course of first restricting rural-urban 
migration and then excluding rural migrants from public services in an attempt to 
prevent chaos in cities. With changes in the macroeconomy and migration patterns in 
the twenty-first century, this strategy no longer makes social or economic sense. As a 
result, there has been a major reorientation of policy goal in the past few years toward 
making temporary rural migrants into permanent urban citizens. 
 
This dissertation examines the factors that influence migration decisions, experiences, 
and outcomes from the perspectives of rural migrant households in this time of “people-
centered” urbanization. It builds on the body of literature that sees internal migrants in 
developing countries as going through a similar process of adaptation and assimilation 
against structural barriers. Combining quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry, I 
construct an explanatory framework for settlement intention, housing ownership, and 
access to education. The findings demonstrate the critical importance of non-economic 
considerations when family members are involved. Using the case study of one of the 
least developed provinces, I show the irreversibility of the urbanization process and the 
 imperative to expand economic development to include equity goals.  
 
This dissertation contends that because both the state and migrant households in lower-
tier cities have fewer choices, resources, and opportunities, dispersing migration from 
mega-cities as the central government is doing right now does not address the problems 
of poverty and exclusion among rural migrants and therefore does not constitute people-
centered or high-quality urbanization as it is so proclaimed. Herein lies the dilemma. 
Provincial capitals and major prefectures in the less developed interior are – in a manner 
of speaking – the “last stop on this train”, where burden-shifting is no longer viable. As 
such, these cities should be equally important as sites of equitable urbanization. 
Furthermore, their development should serve to free up mobility so that migrants have 
more options about where to go rather than deter it.                  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The significance of rural-urban migration in contemporary China cannot be overstated 
– if just because of its sheer volume alone. The latest official estimate puts the number 
of off-farm rural migrants at 286 million, of which 137 million are found in metropolitan 
centers1. For the first time in 2011, more than half of Chinese people regularly lived in 
urban areas (Chan, 2011). Substantively, rural-urban migration has involved major 
changes in production relations, governance institutions, and regional development 
policies, resulting in dramatic socio-spatial transformations that could be seen and felt 
within and beyond the borders. Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz once famously said: 
“high-tech development in the United States and China’s urbanization would be two 
key factors affecting the process of human society development in the 21st century.” 
That and the frequent citations of it by politicians and academics are a testament to the 
potentially far-reaching consequences. From a theoretical standpoint, China constitutes 
an intriguing case: Massive, ex-socialist, and authoritarian, it boasts a governance 
system with a unique configuration of processes, mechanisms, and institutions that is 
not easily explained by any existing analytical frameworks and has produced distinct 
patterns and outcomes that have been the subject of much research and debate.   
 One of the most characteristic features of China’s urbanization is the systematic 
exclusion of rural migrants from urban public services by means of the household 
                                                 
1 National Bureau of Statistics: Migrant Monitoring Report 2018. 
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registration (hukou) system. Originated in the socialist era for job assignment and 
resource allocation – among other planning purposes – the centrally-governed hukou 
system imposed strict spatial delineations between administrative units, particularly 
along the urban-rural boundary and thereby limited people’s free movement across 
localities. The urban-rural dualistic system reflected the divide between industrial 
production and agricultural production, with the latter serving a supporting function to 
the former. Even as marketization was underway, the essence of the hukou system was 
preserved to prevent population movement from getting out of control. Due to the 
effective implementation of this institution, China was able, for a time, to sidestep the 
common pitfalls of “Third World urbanization” – unemployment, slum proliferation, 
and so forth. As time went on, the hukou system’s restrictive power on labor mobility 
gradually diminished under the growing force of the market, but it continued to define 
a person’s entitlement to public resources in a particular place based on whether his or 
her hukou status is local or non-local and agricultural or non-agricultural – engendering 
a division in cities between the protected and the precarious and a labor regime founded 
on the exploitation of temporary migrant workers. 
 This method of managing urbanization did in fact contribute to rapid economic 
growth and lessened the immediate pressures on cities, but it was bound to run into 
problems when migrants began spending longer time in cities, adapting to urban living, 
and raising their families there. The increasing demand on social services put them at 
odds with the governments of receiving cities and some of the existing residents who 
are afraid of resource dilution. Public debates on the issues related to burgeoning 
migrant communities intensified as more citizens became aware of the injustice toward 
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a people who provided the necessary labor for cities to function. Economists pointed 
out that China was in danger of falling into the middle-income trap as an export-oriented 
economy that the country has adopted and so depended on had run its course. In 
response, the national leadership called for a shift in developmental priority from the 
narrow focus on economic performance to broader considerations for livelihood 
improvement and balanced growth. In 2014, State Council unveiled a plan titled New 
Urbanization Plan 2014-2020 (hereafter referred to as NUP), outlining ambitious 
objectives to be achieved in six years and heralding a new phase of “people-centered” 
urbanization, in which the urban integration of rural migrants moved to the top of 
China’s developmental agenda (China Development Research Foundation, 2013).  
 It was against this backdrop of rapid and transformative changes in China’s 
economy and society that this dissertation research was carried out. Institutionally, the 
hukou barrier along the urban-rural line has become much more porous, meaning that a 
rural registration status is no longer as inferior as it was in the past: For many families, 
it is actually preferable to hang on to it. The governance of the hukou system has also 
decentralized. Because cities are mostly free to formulate their own policies, there are 
large variations from place or place, and implementation within a place is often uneven 
as well depending on the specific departments or agencies that hold such power. On the 
other end of things, migrants have over time adapted to the restrictive policy settings 
and to varying degrees of success learned to mobilize personal resources via mostly 
non-state networks, reconfigured urban spaces through their presence, and effected 
limited progressive changes through their unique form of politics. New demographic 
patterns emerged as a result: According to survey data, the number of dependents in the 
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city has been steadily on the rise as more families decided to migrate together for the 
benefit of the next generation2. In the larger picture, emergent, rapidly-growing cities 
are becoming more competitive against more established cities as migrant destinations3 
(Chan, 2010). Countless reports of labor shortages and cities fighting for migrant 
workers with incentives demonstrated that both migration patterns and power dynamics 
have shifted.  
These developments have important theoretical, empirical, and practical 
implications. It is more imperative than ever that rural migrants be treated not as victims 
of the structure but active agents who vote with their feet, even as the extent of agency 
remains widely varied among them (Wang and Wu, 2010). Similarly, urban citizenship 
needs to be reconceptualized in a way that takes us beyond the hukou/non-hukou binary: 
Reforms to the system have allowed some rural people with resources and connections 
to access city services without the need for formal hukou conversion; in other words, 
unequal treatment for different segments within the migrant population is more 
prevalent. Data collection and analysis should focus more on the household and 
community level to better understand the nuances in migration choices. The selection 
of sites should expand beyond a few large metropolitan centers to include secondary 
cities and towns. As for policy, a fundamentally different approach to migration 
governance that does not rely on the short-sighted strategy of subsidizing labor 
                                                 
2 China Institute for Income Distribution: Chinese Household Income Project Survey 2002, 2007, 2013; 
National Bureau of Statistics: Migrant Monitoring Reports 2009-2017. 
3 Hartley, Kris. “The Rise of China’s Inland Cities”. The Diplomat. May 2, 2015. Accessed Apr. 15, 
2019. https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/the-rise-of-chinas-inland-cities. 
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reproduction using rural resources is needed now that the new generation of migrants 
becomes increasingly disconnected from their country roots.    
 These considerations have led me to formulate the following main research 
question: 
“How do the varied household resources/characteristics and contextual factors 
shape rural-to-urban migration experiences, choices, and outcomes?” 
 
I am particularly interested in the implied geographical aspect in this question. The 
various regions in China are under distinct developmental circumstances. Crudely 
speaking, the western region is underdeveloped relative to the eastern region. As a 
migrant-sourcing region with under-sized cities, the western region as a whole has not 
received much attention as urbanization sites and migration destinations. This needs to 
be fixed given the broader sweeping changes outlined above. I postulate that at least 
some parts of the western region exhibit different migration dynamics than what is 
commonly portrayed in the eastern region in some important ways. To better understand 
the interplay between agency and structure in the migration process, this main question 
can be further broken down into the following sub-questions: 
 
1. How does the Chinese state respond to the increasing demand on urban services 
due to migration at the national, provincial, and local level? 
Given the ponderous role of the state, the first stop is to understand state 
responses to the challenges of rural-urban migration. It is important to 
distinguish which policies are helping to move forward in the quest for the full 
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incorporation of migrants, and which ones are a step back. For example, the 
NUP is an example of national guidelines that aim to reallocate resources among 
people and localities; provincial governments can formulate hukou policies such 
as removing the agricultural/non-agricultural distinction to make it easier for 
rural residents within a prefecture to access urban services; local governments 
often have the authority and discretion to exclude certain people from public 
education and affordable housing based on their documents.    
 
2. How do social and developmental policies affect the geographies of migration? 
There is a geographical component to urbanization policies at the national level 
that is likely to produce complex interactions with existing the patterns of 
migration flows and regional relations. In an attempt to rectify the severe 
regional inequality and the strain on large cities due to high volumes of in-
migration, the central government has been encouraging the development of 
small towns and cities in underdeveloped regions since the late 1990s. Many 
interior provinces became the recipients of massive infrastructural investment, 
driving urbanization. I posit that the outcomes in these places are likely to differ 
from those in large, advanced cities: there may be additional or unfamiliar 
challenges due to resource constraints as well as opportunities for more equitable 
development due to more local and short-distance migration.  
 
3. Which factors enable or hamper a rural household’s intention and ability to settle 
down in cities? 
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These could be at the household level – such as resources in rural areas, 
resources in the city, education attainment, future plans and aspirations, etc. – or 
at the meso-level, including labor market conditions, wage differentials, housing 
prices, social policies, and other place-based characteristics. This question 
focuses on personal choices and motivations as they are influenced by the 
settings. I postulate that because people with fewer resources are less mobile, 
migrants in poor provinces might be more inclined to move to and live in cities 
that are closer to them as long as they can afford to; other factors matter less. 
Although the hukou system adds a layer of insecurity, but it does not stop many 
rural migrant families from making a life in the city. 
 
4. What determines social citizenship and mobility for migrant households? 
This question looks at urbanization outcome variables (housing, welfare, 
education) at the household level. Having access to these resources is critical to 
transitioning and integrating into urban life and breaking out of the cycles of 
poverty and precarity. This question also focuses on family and household rather 
than the individual worker. While the hukou system cannot stop people from 
coming to the cities, it is a useful mechanism for cities to selectively withhold 
services from migrants. On the other hand, as these outcomes vary widely among 
migrants, hukou status is by no means the only explanation. This is because the 
progress in urbanization and market transition necessitates that hukou 
restrictions be relaxed and made more flexible, which in turn give local 
governments more room to make arbitrary decisions. This also suggests that the 
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deeply-entrenched inequality is unlikely to be resolved even as the hukou system 
gets dismantled and one day eliminated. 
 
5. How do migrant households and communities cope with and strategize around 
deprivation and discrimination? 
Regressive policies prevent some migrants from ever owning a home or 
enrolling their children in public schools in the city or becoming a formal urban 
resident. In response, they have created an entire self-sustaining social 
infrastructure and support network that are distinct from and yet, at the same 
time, intricately interwoven with the planned city. Informal settlements are 
usually under-serviced, but they offer invaluable resources to migrants; part of 
the reason for that is precisely their deregulation and detachment from the state 
apparatus. It is as much in the hukou conversions from rural to urban as in the 
proliferation of vulnerable yet resilient communities where urbanization 
happens. 
This dissertation as a whole seeks to answer these questions through piecing 
together a variety of source materials. They are not new questions, but because the 
developmental conditions and circumstances have changed dramatically since then, 
they are worth revisiting, especially in light of NUP. The literature mainly addresses 
institutional impediments (structure) and household strategies (agency) simultaneously 
when exploring related questions (e.g. Solinger, 1999; Fan, 2008). Currently, there are 
a few notable debates: to what extent, and for what reasons, migrants would choose to 
settle down in (which) cities; the effects of local policy reforms in the areas of hukou, 
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welfare, affordable housing, and education on micro-level decisions about migration; 
and how a household’s trans-local resources and financial, social, and cultural capital 
determine the urban livelihood and mobility of its members. These factors are the 
driving forces behind the changing geographies and demographics of migration. Data 
scarcity has resulted in inconclusive, geographically limited, or non-comparable 
evidence, and inadequate knowledge about these issues undermines the recognition for 
where and how to target policy efforts. The role of the state in migration governance is 
also exceedingly difficult to pin down because of the internal fragmentations, enormous 
differences among localities, and the multitude of actors involved.  
 The present research builds on and contributes to these conversations by looking 
beyond hukou status at alternative conceptualizations of urban citizenship and the 
diverse trajectories migrant households undertake to navigate around hukou restrictions. 
It does so through a national-level quantitative study on urban homeownership and a 
field study in Guizhou province – a mostly rural but rapidly-urbanizing region populated 
by migrants typically from the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum. Guizhou is a 
suitable site for analyzing local or intraprovincial migration with low barriers between 
origins and destinations, which, I argue, will become more prevalent as a mode of 
migration in the coming years. Despite the developmental delays, the region is picking 
up momentum at a time when both the urban integration of migrants and development 
of interior regions are major policy goals at the national level. The province has also 
been aggressively pursuing a sustainable development agenda. The qualitative portion 
of this dissertation profiles migration experiences in connection with regional economic 
development. As an example of social services, I investigate the role of low-fee informal 
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schools in integrating migrant families in the provincial capital. This interesting albeit 
unusual geographical choice for a case study will hopefully contribute to a better 
understanding of urbanization dynamics in emergent city-regions.  
 The conceptual framework of this dissertation is informed by three analytical 
approaches. The first is Solinger’s (1999) observation that the lack of state support and 
intervention resulted in more space for migrants to self-organize and exercise their 
agency. This suggests that valuable lessons can be learned from interior cities in China 
which have fewer resources to support migrants but more tolerance for informal 
activities. The second is the application of theories from immigration studies (e.g. Alba 
and Logan, 1992) to explain the widening intra-group disparities among China’s 
internal migrants. For example, some scholars argued that the hukou system is no longer 
relevant for some migrants because they have successfully adapted and achieved 
upward mobility without ever converting to urban hukou (Huang et al., 2014; Yang et 
al., 2018; Tao et al., 2015). The third is the sociological approach that treats migration 
decisions as not only rooted in rational, economic calculations but also emotional, 
sociocultural considerations which, like in new economics of migration, focuses on 
households rather than individuals as the appropriate units of analysis (Stark and Bloom, 
1985; Constant and Massey, 2003; Fan, 2008; Du and Li, 2012; Chen and Liu, 2016). 
Children, for example, are a key factor shaping migration dynamics even though they 
contribute relatively little labor (Wang et al., 2019).  
 I employed mixed methods to answer my proposed research questions, 
beginning with a deductive regression analysis in the first stage, followed by a grounded 
theory approach in the second stage, to examine and construct explanations based on 
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narratives and observations. Quantitative analysis is necessary for testing the 
relationships between possible explanatory variables and outcome variables on a large 
geographical scale. Understanding migration dynamics, however, is also aided by a 
close examination of experiences, behaviors, and motivations as revealed through 
personal narratives. Qualitative investigation is particularly important for non-central 
settings such as ordinary cities and peripheral regions, which are underrepresented in 
country-wide surveys. The two contrasting approaches complement each other in 
deriving an explanatory framework that can account for the multiple dimensions of 
human urbanization and migration in China. 
The quantitative portion uses the “China Household Finance Survey” (CHFS) 
conducted by the Southwest University of Economics and Finance in Chengdu, China, 
in 2011, 2013, and 2015. The survey is recent and rich in information, making it one of 
the best available datasets for analysis at the household level. I extracted the subset of 
rural migrants to analyze the relationship between homeownership and welfare 
citizenship. Since the data are not specific to the migrant population, there may be a 
sampling bias toward better-situated migrants. Nevertheless, descriptive summaries of 
key variables confirm the validity of the sample via comparison with other known 
sources. The results are useful for identifying significant factors that can be further 
examined through qualitative research. 
The fieldwork, consisting of site visits, observations, interviews, and focus 
groups, was carried out during the summers of 2016 and 2017 in the two largest 
prefectural cities of Guizhou (Guiyang and Anshun) and a subset of counties, districts, 
towns, and villages in a large developmental zone between them. Other qualitative data 
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comes from government documents, media reports, and Chinese language research 
publications. I reached my interview participants mainly through snowball and 
convenience sampling. It was often necessary to be referred and introduced by mutual 
acquaintances to people of authority such as public officials and school administrators 
in order to speak with them. I began with local contacts within my personal and 
professional network who were in a position to refer me to a variety of human sources. 
Their presence during interviews made my subjects more comfortable, trusting, and 
forthcoming. The access to ordinary migrants was easier to gain and could be obtained 
without going through an intermediary. The process of recruiting family migrants 
usually began in and around schools. My knowledge of the local dialect facilitated my 
understanding and interpreting of the narratives. 
  My findings show that the permanent urbanization of rural migrants can occur 
two ways: 1) being included in urban social provisions and 2) being disconnected from 
the countryside and forced to rely on informal, non-state provisions. Both result in 
developing strong ties to city life but with different implications. For the migrants in 
Guiyang who came from depressed rural areas in the province, not only are there 
preciously few rural resources that can be leveraged, but their mobility is also hampered 
by limited financial and human capital. As a result, they are deeply committed to making 
a life in the city despite the pervasive exclusion and marginalization that they 
experience. The city government, in turn, has little choice but to passively accept their 
presence while continuing to impose stringent restrictions on who has access to the 
scarce city resources. While the government can maintain hukou barriers (indeed, it is 
almost as hard to get a hukou in Guiyang as it is in Beijing), it cannot count on 
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employing exclusionary measures to reduce migration pressures, because it is home to 
entire families of permanent migrants who have nowhere else to go. Urbanization in 
peripheral areas benefits primarily local migrants and educated migrants who are better 
able to seize what few opportunities emerging from developmental programs. Although 
rural interventions are easier to implement than urban ones, their area of effect appears 
limited.  
 This dissertation arrives at these findings through a series of studies on rural 
migrant households, to be presented in the chapters that follow. Together, they advance 
the central thesis: Rural-urban migration in China is taking on a more permanent and 
irreversible character, and more families are making the move together. At the same 
time, households with few resources are being crowded out of metropolitan centers by 
high living costs and exclusionary policies. The latter, as I see it, is a move to not just 
ease the pressure on first-tier cities but also reduce the overall public expenditure since 
smaller cities provide fewer services and quality jobs that come with benefits. Migrants 
pushed and confined to these less developed destinations, broadly speaking, simply do 
not have as many opportunities to move up the socioeconomic ladder. This is the 
dilemma referred to in the title: Such a form of “people-centered” urbanization is 
unlikely to deliver on its promise to lift more people out of poverty.    
Based on this conclusion, I argue that although late-developing cities face strong 
pressures for rapid economic development and GDP growth, social redistribution must 
also be prioritized due to the specificities of their migrant demographics – local 
(intraprovincial), permanent, and disadvantaged. For Guizhou province, the sustainable 
framework is not complete without equity goals, such that economic gains do not solely 
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benefit large corporations and their skilled employees imported from elsewhere but also 
local migrants who are struggling to make ends meet at the lowest rung of the job ladder. 
At the national level, achieving spatially-balanced urbanization needs to be 
substantiated by increased aid for public services in emergent city-regions to avoid 
creating a permanent underclass. 
This dissertation is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 presents the current status of knowledge on China’s urbanization by 
reviewing the literature on rural-urban migration in China and developing countries in 
general. This chapter serves the purposes of outlining a conceptual framework and 
providing the necessary background information for understanding the broader context. 
Certainly, such a complex topic cannot be sufficiently covered in a single chapter or 
even a tome, so I selectively focus on certain recent developments in, and leading up to, 
the phase commonly referred to as “new urbanization” which, as mentioned earlier, is 
characterized by a sharp re-orientation of policy priority toward human development. I 
review the theories of rural-urban migration developed from the Global South context 
as well as migration studies, reflect on the evolution of migration dynamics and 
governance strategies in China, and discuss the implications of the proposed citizenship 
reforms as part of the NUP.  
Chapter 3 uses the CHFS data from 2015 – one year into the era of new 
urbanization – to investigate the relationship between homeownership and access to 
social security among rural migrant households. Following the dismantling of public 
housing and socialist welfare, the government encouraged city residents to purchase 
housing as part of asset-building, which would allow them to rely less on state welfare 
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and gain more access to privatized goods and services (Wang, 2016; Izuhara, 2016). 
While homeownership rate is high among city residents, the same cannot be said about 
rural migrants. For rural migrants who have no prior connections to the city, purchasing 
a home could be associated with commitment to living in the city, which would entail 
long considerations for the prospects of security and stability, as opposed to an 
investment decision that has little to do with other institutional or social ties to the city. 
If evidence in support of the former hypothesis prevails, it would suggest that policy 
efforts that enable long-term settlement such as broadening the social security coverage 
could help to improve urban homeownership rate among migrants, raise consumption, 
and propel urbanization.  
Chapter 4 opens with migration statistics showing the rise of inland destinations 
and a discussion of this entails in terms of migrant incorporation and equitable 
development. It then presents examples of how migrants in Guizhou made decisions 
about migration, navigated the sea of obstacles, and developed enduring connections to 
cities, and how all these fit within the broader developmental context of the province.  
Their experiences suggest that what draws migrants to the city and keeps them there 
does not necessarily have to be related to some of the factors commonly thought of as 
contributing to migration and settlement intention – high wages, quality housing, access 
to public services, connections with local residents, and so on. By no means do I suggest 
that these factors do not matter, only that they are not prerequisite in some places. The 
more educated migrants from Guizhou take up formal jobs in coastal cities, but few 
consider living there for long, especially if family situations make it difficult to do so. 
By contrast, the migrants in the provincial capital city – having had little to no education, 
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working informal jobs that pay poorly, engaging minimally with people outside their 
enclave neighborhoods, and taking almost nothing from the state – have no plans to 
leave city anywhere on the horizon. Considering these cases, the role of the hukou 
system is less to deflect the cost of public provisions to the countryside – since none 
exist in the deprived villages in which these migrants originate – than to avoid it 
altogether.      
Chapter 5 picks up this thread with the specific example of low-fee private 
schools – also commonly known as migrant schools – the abundant supply of which has 
allowed many children to migrate to the provincial capital with their parents, making 
Guiyang one of the most receptive cities for families. A close examination of these 
schools reveals both the mechanisms by which community connections are developed 
and the problems associated with segregation. The education of migrant children is 
exemplary of the dynamic that the poorest segments of the migrant population are 
simultaneously the most dependent on the informal schools to stay in the city – for 
leaving their children in the village is often not an option – and the most hurt by this 
institutional arrangement whereby access to public education may be forever out of 
reach because they cannot accrue any of the required documentation. Even as more 
migrant students are being incorporated in public schools, this group of children remains 
left behind. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CITIZENSHIP 2020 
 
Chapter Overview 
Developing countries are urbanizing with such a rapid pace that providing basic services 
to all has proven to be an insurmountable challenge. Among them, China stands out 
with a political system that can exercise certain exclusionary policies that are unlikely 
to be implemented as effectively elsewhere. Some of these succeeded in making rural 
migrants second-class with minimal popular resistance. For years, the fact that migrants 
had no right to city resources was a generally accepted structural feature, since they 
were not official registrants there. Yet as more rural people began seeking a better and 
more permanent life in cities, the old justification for denying them equal access to 
resources based on their temporary residency began to lose its strength. Over the past 
decade, there has been much talk by policymakers about eliminating some of the 
discriminatory policies deemed to cause harm to the “harmonious society” that the 
central leadership has sought to build – culminating in the New Urbanization Plan of 
2014.  As part of this new plan for sustainable urbanization, the Chinese state has 
redoubled its commitment to integrating rural migrants as urban citizens and made 
significant headways in pro-migrant social policies, such as the expansion of access to 
public education and social security. Many smaller cities lifted hukou restrictions 
completely in accordance with central directives, while others received developmental 
assistance to further the goal of achieving a more spatially balanced urbanization.  
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Some scholars interpret this new development (and the series of reforms that 
have led up to it) as a complete turn of the central government’s stance from neglecting 
urbanization to embracing it, from controlling migration to serving migrants (Davies 
and Ramia, 2018; Chen et al., 2019; Chen and Gao, 2011; Zhou, 2018). This is a 
relatively optimistic view, and there is truth in it. Others, however, point out the lack of 
substantial reforms in the largest cities where migrants are disproportionately 
concentrated and criticize the proposal to divert people to less populated places as 
insensitive to individual mobility decisions (Wang et al., 2015; Chen and Fan, 2016). 
Building on this latter line of critiques, this chapter puts forth the argument that recent 
policy efforts reflect the logic of authoritarian governance and development planning 
adapted to, and accommodating, the maturing market economy and are thus more of a 
continuation of the familiar exclusionary practices than a radical departure. The 
construct of urban citizenship is becoming more localized, depoliticized, and 
“meritocratized” under the current wave of reforms which, progressive though they 
appear, have equipped local governments with new tools to exclude certain groups. 
Even though people are now entirely free to move, the disenfranchisement of the most 
disadvantaged migrants remains and is frequently used to rationalize displacement or 
other drastic measures to reduce migration pressure (Henderson, 2010). Although the 
aim is to raise the level of de-facto urbanization (i.e. percentage of people entitled to the 
full range of urban services), decentralized governance and the large spatial disparities 
in resource distribution mean that what citizenship entails varies widely from place to 
place. Since cities with lower levels of development struggle with service provisions, 
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driving low-skilled, low-income workers there – even if successful, which is 
questionable – may not constitute a transformative improvement in equity.  
The chapter provides the necessary background for situating the subsequent 
empirical chapters via a snapshot of China urbanization trajectory and current status. It 
opens with a discussion on urbanization in developing countries and identifies some of 
the common structural factors. These are as crucial as contextually distinct experiences 
for understanding the hybrid nature of China’s urbanization process. I then review the 
status of knowledge on internal migration and urban citizenship in China to analyze the 
implications of the latest urbanization policies that aim to formally incorporate 100 
million more rural migrants by 2020.  
 
The Trouble with “Third World” Urbanization 
John Friedmann (2006) argued that “China’s urbanization, although entwined with 
globalization processes, is to be understood chiefly as an endogenous process leading 
to a specifically Chinese form of modernity” (p. 440). A good place to start then, before 
delving into the peculiarities of the Chinese case, is identifying some of these global or 
globalizing processes that have shaped “Third World” 4  urbanization. Indeed, 
urbanization in late-developing countries has perplexed and intrigued academics and 
policymakers – from the inadequacies of conventional theoretical frameworks to the 
repeated failures of developmental efforts. The proliferation of shantytowns and 
informal economic activities, the persistent segregation among pockets of concentrated 
                                                 
4 “Third World” is used as a shorthand here. It is a now defunct term with no real suitable substitute 
referring to the collective experiences of countries that developed relatively late and departed from the 
modernization thesis characterizing the Anglo-American stages of development. 
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wealth and poverty, the continuous inflow of people in large numbers despite the 
miserable conditions and/or government sanctions, and the inadequacy of planning 
systems to address urban population explosion are unfamiliar to the earlier Northern 
experience. Moreover, scholars have identified the phenomenon of over-urbanization 
and urban primacy/oligarchy – a situation in which large segments of people earning a 
marginal living are disproportionately concentrated in one or a few large cities, while 
other regions are severely lagging and suffering from population loss – as unique to the 
Third World (Kasarda and Crenshaw, 1991; Henderson, 2002). For many years, the 
culprit was believed to be rural-urban migration and the improper management of it 
with a speed and scale that exceed the progress of industrial development.  
It is important to remember at the outset that urbanization is as much about the 
growing quantity of people as it is about the changing quality of life. Mabogunje (1970) 
defined it concisely as – at the societal level – “a basic transformation of the nodal 
structure of a society in which people move from generally smaller, mainly agricultural 
communities to larger, mainly non-agricultural communities” and – at the individual 
level – “a permanent transformation of skills, attitudes, motivations, and behavioral 
patterns such that a migrant is enabled to break completely with his rural background 
and become entirely committed to urban existence” (p. 2). Urban scholars such as Wirth 
(1938) and Simmel (1903) saw the post-industrial city life as fundamentally different 
from traditional life. Lefebvre (1966) predicted an urban transformation with totality, 
finality, and irreversibility.   
Cities in developing countries may have grown more rapidly than their Northern 
counterparts, but (or rather because of it) the “transformation” has been more reserved 
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than predicted: spaces and settlements remained suspended in the middle of the urban-
rural spectrum; migrants filed into unproductive employment in the city; many new 
urbanites lacked full citizenship rights; traditional values and kinship ties endured. 
Cities are constantly growing and changing, but these patterns remain remarkably 
consistent across many different contexts. Yet even though rural migrants are treated as 
lesser citizens (Abbas, 2016), the lack of incorporation and other hardships seem to have 
much effect in deterring new entries. People flock to the city “to take advantage of 
capitalist produced possibilities no matter whether capital accumulation is going on or 
not, and often in the face of economic conditions that are just as, if not more appalling 
than, those left behind” (Harvey, 1996). With the ever-growing and gradually maturing 
migration networks and infrastructures, cities attract more people as they expand, while 
service and infrastructure provision struggle to keep up, leaving large segments of urban 
dwellers in a kind of unincorporated limbo.  
This dynamic can be traced to certain preconditions and drivers common to 
developing countries. Historical-structuralists brought to light the exploitative macro-
environment within which urbanization in peripheral countries evolved. Locked into a 
pattern of unequal exchange in the process of global capitalist accumulation, peripheral 
countries were kept in a state of underdevelopment by an alliance of their own 
bourgeoisie with the capitalists. Extracting profits required that labor costs be kept at 
the minimum. The need to subsidize the formal sector resulted in the development of 
the informal or survival economy, in which workers are responsible for their own 
reproduction and treated as mostly expendable (Portes, 1978). Rural surplus labor is 
funneled into the under-employed and unregulated job ranks with wages barely above 
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subsistence, and yet people are drawn to the promise of opportunities despite the low 
chance of its realization. The pessimism about rural-urban migration reached the peak 
with Todaro’s prediction of a continuous influx-unemployment downward spiral 
accompanying any form of urban investment in generating employment opportunities 
which then lead to excessive migration – “a symptom of and a factor contributing to 
Third World underdevelopment” (Todaro, 1980: p. 363). The informal economy not 
only sustains migrants by substituting for formal employment and state social 
protection, but it is deeply integrated with the formal sector such that it has become a 
structural feature of peripheral accumulation (Castells and Portes, 1989; Roberts, 2014). 
Diffusion of economic benefits to lagging regions, according to Berry (1973), is stymied 
in developing countries due to the large urban-rural gap and an economic structure that 
is resistant to decentralization, as “each increment of the urban economy draws in more 
migrants, to maintain wages at the subsistence minimums” (p. 99). Other explanations 
for urban over-concentration in developing countries include high natural population 
increase and authoritarian or centralized governance regimes (Berry, 1973; Shandra et 
al., 2003; Lottum and Marks, 2012).  
While cities are important sites of agglomeration, over-urbanization – with its 
attendant consequences of poverty, unemployment, overload on public resources, and 
environmental issues – is widely perceived to be a sign of crisis. Rapid influx of 
migrants into large cities is alarming for the state for several reasons. First, it frustrates 
attempts at comprehensive planning, which has a much longer time frame than the pace 
of demographic changes. Second, congestion and crowding are some of the most 
noticeable changes that happen with population increase. The encroachment on existing 
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urban space increases the intensity and frequency of conflicts with local residents. 
Moreover, cities in the global south are generally ill-equipped to handle the added strain 
on the upkeep of urban infrastructure and service delivery, because not only are 
resources scarce, urban planning systems in (especially post-colonial) countries follow 
outdated Western models and are maladapted to deal with the massive in-migration 
(Watson, 2009). Despite planners’ best efforts, cities seem to grow haphazardly. 
Attempts at imposing order have resulted in more fragmented spaces and segregated 
neighborhoods, pushing the urban poor into self-built housing with uncertain tenure 
status in under-serviced neighborhoods (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). Rising inequality is 
a source of constant threat to social stability and political legitimacy of the governing 
regime. In short, there is every political incentive to limit rural-urban migration despite 
its proven benefits to the economy.  
 
Why Migration Controls Fail 
Scaling back urban population growth to match the actual level of development seemed 
to be the obvious solution to the problem of over-urbanization. Governments all over 
the developing world have experimented with a number of overt and covert strategies 
over the years – including direct mobility controls, wage adjustments, rural development 
projects, industry re(locations), policy (dis)incentives, and infrastructural investments 
(Lucas, 1997) – in order to redistribute the population and reduce the pressure on key 
cities. These strategies were, at best, questionable in terms of effectiveness and, at worst, 
exacerbated urban inequality and left more people without access to formal 
employment, housing, and basic services. Some failed because they were not seriously 
25 
followed through, either due to conflict of interest or the conflicting view of migrants 
as simultaneously an economic solution and a social problem (Stark, 1980). A 2014 
report by International Organization for Migration argues that in the experience of 
BRICS, the most serious social problems associated with low-income migrants were 
caused by earlier attempts to restrict migration and that these attempts spilled over to 
affect not just migrants but other urban poor as well (IOM, 2014).  
The various theoretical traditions all seem to suggest that efforts to restrict 
voluntary economic migration are doomed to failure, and that places that make use of 
temporary migrant laborers almost always inevitably end up needing to confront the 
issues of overwhelming numbers and pressures to incorporate migrants in the local 
citizenry. Classical economic explanations offer the greatest promise that migration can 
be controlled: Since these emphasize the conditions at two ends of the migration journey 
and say little if anything about what happens in between or the people involved in the 
move, they imply that policy adjustment can moderate migration by altering these 
conditions. However, a closer reading reveals that once patterns have been established, 
migration does tend to persist and expand under market forces. In Lewis’s (1954) dual-
sector model for the developing economy, rural-urban migration is a deterministic 
process that goes hand-in-hand with capitalist expansion. The model does not include a 
geographical component, but it assumes a trajectory toward full urban absorption in 
both production and social citizenship as the subsistence sector in both urban and rural 
areas shrinks. With increasing length of stay in the city, capitalist workers acquire new 
skills, tastes, and values, and hence organize themselves politically to demand higher 
wages (p. 150). Capitalist firms compete by offering their workers better renumerations, 
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benefits, and other monetary assistance (p. 151). National savings gained from capitalist 
profits then go toward the construction of a system of social insurance and welfare, 
which replaces personal savings as security for old age and illnesses (p. 157). In Lee’s 
push-pull hypothesis, migration sustains itself through its contribution to greater 
diversity in the destination area, more pronounced interregional disparity, accumulation 
of personal or collective experience, and erosion of intervening obstacles – all of which 
lead to more migration. Todaro’s model suggests that while expected urban 
unemployment is a potential deterrent to migration, migrants increase their chance of 
landing an urban job by moving to the city to be closer to recruiters. Some are forced 
by financial constraints to return to the countryside after a period of unsuccessful 
attempts; others, however, prolong the job search process by finding employment in the 
informal sector, and many people end up never making the transfer to the formal sector 
(Fields, 1975). The informal sector, expanding as the formal sector expands, draws more 
people in and enables their stay.  
Structural explanations posit even stronger migration inertia, seeing how it is a 
feature of the world system, such that as long as the power asymmetry between the core 
and periphery persists, there is little governments or individuals can do to change it. The 
incursion of the global capitalist relations into peripheral countries resulted in mass 
displacement and mobilization of rural population. Sociocultural links were formed in 
this process of exchange, facilitating the diffusion of modern values and conspicuous 
spending habits. From a sociological angle on generalized migration, successful 
migrants may develop attachment to their host societies, but much more important is 
the development of stable communities among “failed” migrants. Social ties induce 
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people to take time out of work to spend in one another’s company, and less work means 
longer time to reach their initial earnings target. During this indefinitely prolonged 
period, migrants are compelled to improve their lives by building new relationships or 
bringing old ones from the origin and bargaining for more rights or better working 
conditions (Piore, 1979). With their native-born children rooted in the local way of life, 
the decision to return home becomes an extremely difficult one (Castles, 2004). 
Cumulative causation theories similarly emphasize the role of social context to 
migration propensity, which changes with each act of migration until robust networks 
and communities are formed and a culture of migration is established. Migration 
systems theory also emphasizes the role of migration in information feedback to the 
sources. Stories of successes in a city raises personal aspirations for migration. Against 
the countercurrents of discrimination and other obstacles in the city, migrants still 
manage to acquire skills and possibly accumulate earnings, which contribute to stronger 
determination to stay and possibly improved residential status (Mabogunje, 1970).  
 In summary, the literature on urbanization and rural-urban migration in 
developing countries tells us that the substantial number of unincorporated migrants has 
roots in both structure and agency. City-bound people are not easily deterred by 
adversities inflicted by the state or the market. On the other hand, some scholars did 
challenge the permanent migration paradigm by citing the prevalence of temporary and 
circular migration in some developing countries (Hugo, 1980; Fan, 2008). Migration 
theories tend to understate the role of the state (Fan, 2008). China is a case in point, 
where policies made it so that it was better not to commit to permanent residency in 
cities. Nevertheless, as Nelson (1976) argues in his study on short-term migration in 
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Africa and Asia, temporary migration is but a transitional stage toward more permanent 
patterns in the future. As the next section illustrates, China has, after some delays, 
entered the stage of permanent migration.  
 
Migration Governance in China 
China’s divergence from established patterns can be attributed to a host of historical and 
institutional factors, but the most important one is arguably the high levels of state 
involvement that persisted well into the market era. Writing twenty years ago in 
reference to the various theoretical models explaining migration, Solinger (1999) 
commented that “in an analysis of the Chinese floating population, the models 
themselves do not compete [but] collapse, under the weight of the state – a state much 
more involved in regulating its populace’s mobility than most other states” (p. 153).  
In identifying the stages of urbanization, researchers are able to consistently link 
the prevailing driving forces and outcomes in each stage to specifics in state policy. 
Details vary, but the 1978 socialist-to-market transition and the 1994 administrative 
restructuring are unanimously considered major turning points. More recent studies also 
include the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, which induced massive internal return 
migration. The consensus in economic analyses of China’s urbanization levels is that 
China was under-urbanized until the early 1990s due to migration restrictions (Au and 
Henderson, 2006). Chen et al. (2013) called the period from 1979 to 1995 “stable stage 
of ascension” and the period from 1996 to 2010 “rapid stage of promotion”, between 
which China tipped over from under-urbanization to over-urbanization – an observation 
the authors attributed to the declining fortitude of migration restrictions. Fluctuations in 
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the magnitude and distribution of rural-urban migration are strongly associated with (if 
not caused by) major changes in developmental ideologies and priorities regarding 
cities. For example, there was a notable shift in policy stance – after the political crisis 
of 1989 had subsided – from favoring small cities and towns to encouraging larger urban 
agglomerations, and another in the late 2000s from framing urbanization as a 
problematic by-product of industrial growth to seeing it as a driver of sustainable 
growth. These pro-urban shifts are accompanied by increased intensity of rural-urban 
migration as well as proliferation and expansion of urban administrative units. A more 
recent example is population-capping measures to limit metropolitan growth. These 
measures signaled the return of the fear for “big city ills” which had been tempered 
briefly during the earlier years of rush-to-urbanize. This has led to declining migrant 
population in the largest cities and renewed interest in the potential of small towns.  
 These fluctuations in urbanization patterns are not merely temporal changes at a 
single administrative scale as in the case of a monolithic state. They are also caused by 
fragmentations within the state as well as the increasingly complex relations in the state-
market-society nexus. Rural-urban migration in China took off largely as a result of 
state facilitation but later on became increasingly susceptible to market forces. In the 
early years of market reform, massive institutional and administrative changes were 
made to accommodate the transition. The establishment of special economic zones, 
formation of township and village enterprises, and de-collectivization of agricultural 
land opened the release valve on the reservoir of rural surplus labor, even though the 
volume and direction of population flow were moderated by the central government. 
The eastern region attracted the most migrants due to the preferential policies to which 
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it was subjected for jumpstarting growth with the help of foreign investment. In the first 
decade of economic reform, spontaneous economic migration (as opposed to official 
work transfer or university admittance) was largely limited to nearby towns, where the 
local governments happily sold hukou for extra revenue and, for security concerns, 
particularly welcomed long-term settlement by families (Woon, 1999). Fragmentation 
was beginning to occur: In the absence of official approval from Beijing, local cadres 
in rural areas arranged for out-migration for the benefit of the village (Mobrand, 2008).  
By the early 1990s, foreign direct investment in export sectors has embroiled 
China deeply within global capitalist production. As the private sector expanded, logics 
of the market – profitability and efficiency – also began seeping into the public sector. 
This was matched by a notable shift in political ideology to the credit of national leader 
Deng Xiaoping who prioritized practical results over dogmas and tolerated the price of 
uneven development. The eastern region experienced disproportionate growth at the 
expense of other regions in the country (Fan, 1997). Furthermore, the administrative 
reform in 1994 greatly increased both the fiscal pressure and fiscal autonomy of local 
governments. Since then, urbanization began taking on a global-local or “glocal” 
character. Over the next decade, migration became increasingly long-ranged and 
polarized between east – the destination – and west – the source (Liu et al., 2014; Cao 
et al., 2018). The growing multitude of actors involved in the facilitation of migration 
gradually eroded what few barriers there remained. 
The progress of marketization was relentless such that compromise needed to be 
made on the part of the central government to relinquish control on migration and give 
localities more autonomy. The state must yield to pro-urban developmental pressure in 
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order to maintain uninterrupted economic growth and, by extension, its political 
legitimacy. Yet for such a massive authoritarian regime, any form of mass migration is 
potentially destabilizing, but extreme social inequality in highly concentrated urban 
areas is particularly dangerous. In order to keep over-concentration in check and 
minimize the accumulation of urban grievances, the Chinese government preserved the 
hukou system – a socialist planning instrument, thereby continuing to uphold the 
privileged status of urban residents while rendering migrants temporary and 
undemanding. Wallace (2014) called the hukou system “China’s loophole to the 
Faustian bargain of urban bias”, because it is able to subvert political crises commonly 
associated with urban congestion. Even as population movement gradually and 
inevitably slipped out of control, the hukou system acts to this day as a barrier to 
settlement and integration. There is much written on the origin and evolution of the 
hukou system, which I will not rehash here. Suffice to say that it is comparable to an 
internal passport that fixes state-sponsored entitlements in place, ascribing migrants – 
especially those from rural areas – an “outsider” status. In its decentralized form, the 
hukou system does not prevent free movement so much as it does institute a divisive 
citizenship and arm local governments with an arsenal of tools to exclude migrants from 
public resources while exploiting their labor (Zhang and Wang, 2010). Today, rural-
urban migration accounts for more than half of the increase in total urban population 
(Chen and Song, 2014), but much of it does not involve hukou conversion. The 
discrepancy between urban hukou population (citizens) and urban de-facto population 
(residents) is frequently invoked as a stylized statistic by urbanists to demonstrate the 
“mirage” that is China’s apparent high urbanization rate. 
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The political imperative of maintaining stability clashes with the economic need 
for labor mobility. This conflict has resulted in the many peculiar top-down social 
policies and governance institutions that led to distinct patterns of internal migration in 
China (Wang and Liu, 2018). At the local level, conflicts arise from the need for migrant 
labor in the cities and inability or unwillingness to pay for the cost of its maintenance 
and reproduction. Exclusionary practices and the dearth of housing and services compel 
migrants to seek alternative, self-help arrangements in the form of enclaves. These are 
typically located out of the way in engulfed villages or unplanned spaces. In the 
beginning, these self-initiated solutions to housing and service problems were probably 
tolerated tacitly despite their questionable legality (for it is unlikely that local officials 
did not notice advertisements plastered all over walls and telephone poles). Over time, 
some of the neighborhoods – particularly the ones formed around kinship and 
employment networks – grew spatially expansive and socially cohesive. According to 
Zhang’s (2001) account of the famous Zhejiangcun – so called because it mostly 
consisted of migrants from Zhejiang – in Beijing, the lack of integration of migrants 
into the urban control system “created opportunities for migrants to develop their own 
social and economic niches in the cities” and for migrant leaders to gain “local control 
through patronage and clientelist networks within these newly emerged migrant 
enclaves” (p. 89). Similarly, according to Solinger (1999): “Left abandoned to scramble 
on their own, quite sizable concentrations of outsiders pooled their resources and carved 
out a means of subsistence over time. Thus, a great paradox characterized floaters living 
in such collectivities. The state’s registration system constrained them, excluded them 
from its privileges, and neglected them in its service network. And yet at the same time 
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they were freed, if to a limited but growing extent, by their abandonment outside the 
pale of the state’s organizations of administration and surveillance; they were also 
increasingly empowered by their own numbers” (p. 251).  
 With the accumulation of collective migration experiences through chain 
migration of families and kin, the dominant “mode” of migration to cities has also 
changed since its onset – from the sole (mostly male) workers migrating temporarily 
with no intention of staying to couple and family migrants living in the cities for longer 
duration with open-ended plans (Fan, 2011; Fan et al., 2011; Fang and Shi, 2018; Chan 
and O’Brien, 2018). The presence of children in the city and their acculturation to city 
life can completely change the equation, even if their educational circumstances in the 
city are not ideal. Settlement took roots despite the myriad obstacles, as theories suggest 
it would. Even though many migrants to this day still rely on rural support systems for 
unemployment, sickness, education, and retirement, permanent stay in the city is 
becoming a viable option for an increasing number of people. The gap in preferences 
between rural migrants and urban residents is also narrowing with each successive 
generation. For example, Zhao et al. (2018) profiled the new-generation (post-1980s-
born) migrants as more educated, more inclined to urban life, and more likely to 
“migrate to urban areas with their spouses [and] consume more in urban areas and send 
less money back home” (p. 18).     
 The tendency toward settlement despite barriers posed by the hukou system can 
be observed in the shift in academic research from focusing on the factors leading to 
permanent migration via hukou conversion to looking instead at the determinants of 
settlement intention without hukou change. This shift is a response to the observation 
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that migrants now have more choices over their destinies. Settlement intention is, of 
course, an experimental outcome that is amorphous and prone to change (after all, who 
can know the future?), but it is useful for assessing the subjective expectations, 
aspirations, and goals – perhaps even more so than any actual future trajectories. The 
mass of publications on settlement intention starting in the late 2000s did not agree on 
the extent of it among the general migrant population – not least due to the fuzzy and 
inconsistent definitions of the outcome variable – but unanimously showed that deeper 
integration in city life contributes to stronger inclination to stay, whether it is better or 
more secure housing (Xie and Chen, 2018; Liu et al., 2017; Zhou, 2018), better or more 
secure employment (Zhu and Chen, 2010; Tan et al., 2017), higher stakes of personal 
investment such as entrepreneurship or self-employment (Cao et al., 2015; Chen and 
Liu, 2016), or more sociocultural and emotional ties (Chen and Liu, 2016; Du and Li, 
2012; Huang et al., 2018). The causality appears to be two-way: People who intend to 
stay seek out better living conditions, demand a higher quality of life, and object to 
discriminatory treatment.  
 
Time for a Change 
As the inclination for urban life among migrants grew, the notion of citizenship also 
came to be an increasingly relevant a topic of conversation in research and policy. It is 
also a difficult one since the availability of low-cost labor formally subsidized by the 
countryside is a major reason for China’s phenomenal economic growth (Vendryes, 
2011). Dualistic urban/rural governance has resulted in a number of seemingly 
promising urbanization outcomes that set China apart – including relatively subdued 
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slum proliferation, low levels of urban unemployment, higher rate of incorporation in 
formal production, and more balanced city size distribution – and make it seem as if 
China has managed to avoid many of the pitfalls that have beset other late-developing 
countries. The fact that rural areas have for so long acted as a reserve and offered 
resources for migrants to fall back on, in some ways, lessened the urgency of the 
problem of service provisions in the city. What would changing this dualistic system 
mean? Who should be made responsible for the increase in public expenditure? 
The humanitarian perspective received a boost from an economic imperative, 
when the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 sounded the wake-up call that China needed 
to be weaned from export-oriented growth (Guo and N’Diaye, 2009). Policymakers 
began calling for strengthening the domestic consumer base by transforming rural 
migrants into urban citizens. In 2013-2014, the State Council launched the NUP as well 
as suggestions on reforming the hukou system. The NUP outlined a “people-centered” 
approach to urbanization that focuses on getting more people to settle down in cities and 
gain access to urban services (Guan et al., 2018). This approach, presumably, is a more 
substantial mode of urbanization – one that can harness the growth potential of 
agglomerations – than either wasteful sprawling of sparsely-populated, seldom-used 
new construction or desperate crowding of transient, frugal, and untaxed people in the 
metropolis. 
 However, the NUP also stipulates that, since many mega-cities on the eastern 
coast are nearing their carrying capacity, migrants should be directed toward smaller 
cities and secondary towns in the interior. This counter-stream movement is to be 
incentivized through tightening hukou restrictions in large cities, loosening hukou 
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restrictions in small cities, and speeding up industrial development and urban-rural 
integration in satellite towns. By the time of writing, almost all provinces have 
eliminated the agricultural vs. non-agricultural distinction in hukou status within 
prefectures or other scales. Although this reform is a largely formal change that needs 
to be substantiated by other policies, it could well reduce the cost of short-distance and 
local migration and make it a more attractive option. Meanwhile, the institutional 
barriers surrounding large cities and along the provincial borders remain mostly 
unchanged. In this manner, urbanization is to be simultaneously sped up and dispersed 
– its overall level raised without drastically increasing urban concentration in any one 
particular area. After all, if people moved to many regular cities instead of just a few 
large cities, there would be less burden added to the shoulders of any single receiving 
locality. This strategy is also in perfect synchronicity with the goal of reducing regional 
inequality. 
 The NUP was immediately met with skepticism. The general critique among 
academics is that it is simultaneously too ambitious – as the financing mechanisms for 
the increased cost of such dispersed urbanization remain unclear – and too conservative 
to have any major effect on the majority of underprivileged migrants in large cities 
(Chan, 2014; Chen et al., 2018). Some argued that the strategy might not significantly 
alter migration patterns (Wang et al., 2015), as studies have shown that migrants prefer 
living in large cities for the opportunities they offer to the next generation. Hu and Chen 
(2015) argued that as great as integrated urban-rural development and city clusters 
sound, they can contribute to widening gap between different regions and drive more 
poor people into expensive cities.  
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New Regimes of Mobility: From Restriction to Displacement 
Recent widespread decentralization in China and beyond has granted city governments 
more authority in handling migrants. In many large cities, not only is the inclusion of 
migrants not prioritized, migrants are frequently blamed for crowding the city. Since 
the “global urban turn” (change in stance from “cities are too large” to “cities are not 
large enough”), the anxiety about rampant city growth has faded somewhat from policy 
rhetoric, but control over migrant population at the local level now wears the disguise 
of city-making and urban (re)development. These projects are often speculative and 
have the power to displace large swaths of informal settlements, pushing migrants 
outward toward the suburbs and pricing them out of prime urban space. The promise of 
securing basic goods and services for the urban poor through trickle-down benefits is 
rarely delivered. Exclusion continues, justified on the basis of notions of place-bound 
citizenship that has been pointed out by scholars as unsuitable for a mobile world, with 
roots in higher-level migration controls from the past. Even more concerning is the use 
of exclusionary practices as a way to discourage migration.  
In the beginning of 2010s, Beijing and Shanghai governments announced their 
plans to control population by eliminating low-end industries and the people working in 
them. These “non-essential personnel” mostly take the form of low-skilled rural 
migrants. Other mega-cities without such a transparent agenda have also pursued 
formalization, redevelopment, and new construction projects to the detriment of migrant 
settlements. While the role of the hukou system in direct migration control has largely 
disintegrated by now, its role as an instrument of division and exclusion remains 
38 
relevant in rationalizing state-driven displacement and indirectly restricting mobility. 
Although informal settlements shoulder much of the load in housing and service 
provision, they eventually get in the way or become so prominent that the outgrowths 
of their activities start encroaching on “territories” of the local residents.  
The destruction of Beijing’s Zhejiangcun in 1995 was one of the earliest, most 
well-documented and politicized cases, involving the eviction of over 40,000 migrants 
and demolition of their homes (Zhang, 2001). The tension in the nation’s capital was 
not abated for long, as migrants soon returned inconspicuously, which was met with 
acquiescence from local officials, and migrant population continued rising. Then, a little 
over a year ago, another similar incident happened in Daxing district of Beijing – a fire 
broke out in a building inhabited by migrants that led to a spectacular display of force 
by the government that caused waves of destruction to rain down on migrant 
neighborhoods in the vicinity. Local officials acted quickly for fear of being held 
responsible for inaction. Many residents and occupants were served an eviction notice 
on the basis that their buildings did not meet safety standards. They were then given 
days or even hours to clear out before their belongings were tossed into the street and 
the buildings were razed to the ground. The sensation was palpable. Foreign media was 
flooded with reports and pictures of neighborhoods in shambles and decries for 
injustice. According to a New York Times article, “local officials have tolerated, 
inspected, and taxed these buildings for years until the current crackdown, when they 
suddenly declared them illegal for being fire hazards, or for lacking permits”. Such 
declarations, followed by the forceful termination of water and electricity, was the 
customary practice in numerous other less dramatic occurrences of displacement. The 
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closure of wholesale markets and low-fee private schools that cater to migrants had 
similar effects of disrupting livelihoods. In Beijing, these actions have caused the 
migrant population to dwindle since 2014. The number of migrant schools dropped from 
over 300 in 2006 to 112 in 2016. Chan and Ren (2018) found a large segment of migrant 
children “missing” from the city.   
 What appears to be more benevolent than these expulsions – but could be in fact 
just as disconcerting – is the institution of a point-based residency system that grants a 
subset of entitlements to migrants meeting the specified qualifications. This reform 
opened up a legal avenue for migrants to gain citizenship by their own merits such that 
those barred from accessing city benefits are “rightfully” handled because they are 
undeserving (Zhang and Wang, 2010). Zhang (2018) interpreted this as a transition 
toward neoliberal-authoritarian rationality of citizenship governance and a shift from 
the “dualistic urban-rural segregation to a multiplication of legal statuses, boundaries, 
and hierarchies of citizenship” (p. 857). Blanket discrimination against migrants has 
been replaced by subtler, more segmented forms of discrimination (Lu and Wang, 
2013). It is likely a response to the changes brought about by marketization and 
privatization, which led to greater differentiation within the migrant population as well 
as more intense contestation with urban residents (Zhang, 2002). Migrants who possess 
the appropriate skills and resources to fulfill a need in the labor market are selectively 
incorporated (Friedman, 2017).  Woodman (2016) argued that “locating citizens and 
governing them through municipal regulatory regimes [with] divergent social 
provisions among localities” have made the distinction between insider and outsider 
(rather than urban and rural) the organizing logic of citizenship (p. 343).  
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The devolution of migration governance – from central control over population 
movement to local control over the resources available for “outsiders” who are 
otherwise free to enter or leave as they wish – has reshaped the mobility regime. For 
instance, by refusing to “warehouse” or maintain certain kind of labor and only 
incorporating them on an “as-needed basis”, local governments can undermine long-
term settlement (Friedman, 2017). Withholding the right to affordable housing pushes 
migrants into urban villages and, in so doing, physically and conceptually “lumps” them 
with rural, feudal things that have no place in the modern city (Siu, 2007). 
Redevelopment projects may benefit local homeowners but rarely address the loss 
suffered by migrant renters – a phenomenon that Tomba (2017) termed “gentrifying 
urbanization”. The practice of “deflection” – to ensure that legal entitlements never 
make it out of the bureaucratic labyrinth to reach their recipients – often has the effect 
of driving migrants out of the city (Chan and O’Brien, 2018).  
When one considers the fact that these measures are common in large cities with 
a global agenda and that resource distribution across different localities is highly 
uneven, the strategy of dispersing urbanization carries broader implications for mobility 
and inequality. Critics of NUP were quick to remark that small cities with few fiscal 
resources are neither attractive to migrants nor capable of absorbing them. Woodman 
(2017) argued that “vast differences among localities in the provision of public services 
and benefits are justified through a ranking of places on a spectrum from ‘backward’ to 
‘advanced’”, with the latter reserved for people of the “advanced” status as determined 
by human and cultural capital. She pointed out that such a regulatory framework does 
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not wholly restrict migration but rather shape it in accordance to public perception of 
where people supposedly belong. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Urbanization in the Global South is often accompanied by a rise in number and scale of 
informal settlements which exist to serve those who are excluded from public provisions 
and in turn draw in more newcomers from the countryside. In China, this process 
occurred in a more controlled and less dramatic fashion because of the hukou system –  
a policy tool based on sedentary welfare allocation and, as such, discriminates against 
outsiders and discourages permanent settlement. It used to alleviate some of the 
immediate pressures for cities, but its restrictions also spurred the growth of self-reliant 
communities such as the famous Zhejiangcun in Beijing.  
In addition, some migrants are able to successfully take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by market transition and accumulate enough wealth to live in 
cities. Commodification of the housing market broadened the options to live in rental 
housing instead of factory dormitories and opened up the possibilities of urban 
homeownership. Entrepreneurial spaces mushroomed in major urban centers as the local 
demand for migrant-supplied goods and services soared. The opportunity to engage in 
flexible employment enabled migrants to bring their families and settle down over 
longer time horizons. The downscaling of migration governance freed up inter-
jurisdictional movement: After all, cities can formulate their own hukou policies, but 
they could hardly interfere with migrants before they arrive or barricade their own 
borders.  
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At the same time that new opportunities are emerging, state retreat from public 
provisions has widened the inequality within the migrant population on the basis of an 
individual’s ability to gain access to privatized resources. Furthermore, recent pro-
migrant reforms tend to reward those who have greater ability to do so at the expense 
of the less fortunate. Although there are nowadays more formal and informal pathways 
toward urban citizenship, the question of “who gets what” has also become more 
intricate: Migrants who have next to nothing are not being helped by the current system, 
if it has not made things worse. The previously rigid top-down state control has been 
supplanted by a softer and more arbitrary form at the local level characterized by 
selective disenfranchisement and slum clearance. Central policies that promote social 
justice and welfare for migrant workers suffer from implementation blocks at the local 
level due to inadequate funding. As a result, local governments resort to “flexible 
interpretation” of these policies to maintain the status quo (Davies and Ramia, 2008). 
Decentralized hukou administration strengthened the authority of some local 
governments to make the variations among localities salient. As some mega-cities like 
Beijing are becoming increasingly hostile toward and unaffordable for the have-nots, 
the less elite cities seem to present opportunities for more equitable and inclusive 
growth. The NUP suggests something akin to a compromise, which is to improve 
regional inequality and entice migrants to spread out to places where they can be 
formally incorporated – killing two birds with one stone. The chapters that follow 
continue to explore the regional angle to China’s urbanization story and, more 
specifically, its association with household-level characteristics of migrants.   
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CHAPTER 3 
HOUSING AND WELFARE 
 
Chapter overview 
The previous chapter discussed the evolving role of the hukou system in shaping urban 
citizenship and ended on the note that the restrictions associated with hukou status have 
nowadays become, for some people, less of an impediment to achieving urban 
livelihoods. The years leading up to NUP saw a turn in China’s urbanization policy 
toward expanding welfare and affordable housing for rural migrants so as to encourage 
them to put down roots in the city. These new developments are the result of the progress 
in market transition and urban assimilation of rural migrants. In this context, 
homeownership in the city is a significant and relevant outcome for migrant households 
because it can be a foothold leading to access to basic services, permanence and 
stability, rise in social status, intergenerational wealth transfer and accumulation, and 
leverage to demand compensation from urban redevelopment. To be sure, a few cities 
have restrictions for non-hukou-holders to purchase homes. In most other cases, 
however, homeownership is a means to overcome hukou limitations and achieve a city’s 
“membership” through market channels. 
 Although China has an exceedingly high homeownership rate among city locals, 
rural migrants are predominantly renters. The limited financial resources of migrant 
households and skyrocketing housing prices in many cities make homeownership 
impossible. Another reason, as suggested by evidence from numerous studies on 
settlement intention, is that migrants are not committed to buying a home if their 
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livelihoods are precarious or if their ties to the city are weak. One major cause of this 
insecurity and uncertainty is the lack of access to social security and other safeguards. 
In light of the heavy emphasis on expanding social security and welfare for migrants in 
national policies, I ask whether efforts in this area could spur more migrants to invest in 
urban housing or, at the household level, whether entitlement to social insurance in a 
city is a determinant for homeownership in the same city. The international scholarship 
disagrees on the relationship between homeownership and welfare – whether the former 
is a substitute for or a consequence of the latter. Immigration studies support the second 
possibility. As the hukou system makes China’s internal migrants akin to foreigners in 
the country, I hypothesize that access to welfare is associated with higher likelihoods of 
homeownership, because it indicates socioeconomic and institutional integration with 
the city and hence the intention to stay.  
This chapter tests this hypothesis against the alternative that migrants purchase 
housing independently of their welfare status in the city or as compensation for not 
enrolling in social security – using the 2015 CHFS survey which contains information 
on household assets. The findings support the settlement/integration story, after 
controlling for other employment factors, which turn out to have no significant effects. 
While these regression results do not say anything about causality, the positive 
association suggests at least the possibility that incorporation in the urban social security 
system contributes to the intent and ability to purchase housing. And if so, policy efforts 
in expanding welfare coverage for rural migrants will have implications for urban 
settlement and consumption. In other words, if the goal is to encourage more migrants 
to settle down in cities as it should be, more insurance and welfare schemes should be 
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made available to them, especially ones that do not require employer sponsorship as 
rural migrants are more likely to be found with informal occupations. 
 
How Important is Hukou, Still? 
The hukou system may have persisted for four decades now since the beginning of 
marketization, but reforms to the housing and welfare system since the late 1990s have 
opened up more avenues for long-term migration. Previously under the planned socialist 
economy, urban experiences were dominated by the “iron rice bowl” model of secure 
employment and housing, sponsored by the state through work units and reserved 
exclusively for urban hukou holders. Rural migrants were barred from urban housing 
and had little incentive to migrate permanently. The model has now been replaced by 
privatized housing and a social security system more befitting the market economy – 
one that is based on a combination of individual payment, employer contribution, and 
state provision (Huang, 2017).  
Partially de-linked from hukou and residency status, urban social insurance has 
become more accessible to rural migrants. Eligibility for employment-based insurance 
depends more on the specifications in the working contract than hukou status (Cheng, 
2014). While separate residency-based schemes exist for urban versus rural hukou-
holders (with large disparity in benefits and payouts), progress is underway to combine 
them into one. The recent elimination of agricultural/non-agricultural distinction in the 
hukou status in most provinces also created new access to urban social insurance for 
local migrants. In general, however, rural migrants are still disadvantaged due to their 
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low status in the labor market and the decentralized or localized administration of social 
welfare.  
Similarly, the commodification of housing has rendered hukou status less critical 
to acquiring urban housing. Most cities do not have restrictions against non-hukou-
holders in purchasing commercial housing listed at market prices. The few that impose 
restrictions do so to specify certain conditions such as payment into social security or 
length of residence so as to discourage speculative housing purchase. Various sources, 
including the survey used here, showed that nowadays among rural migrants, about one 
in five lives in owned housing – certain a substantial improvement since beginning of 
the century. However, the hukou system’s legacy contribution to inequality and 
continued hukou-based discrimination in access to subsidized housing are major factors 
behind the large gap in homeownership rates between urban locals and rural migrants. 
It was mostly the privileged residents that emerged as winners from the housing reforms 
(Logan et al., 2010). The development of the private housing sector in effect replaced 
some of the institutional restrictions with price restrictions.   
 
Housing and Welfare in International Contexts 
Two bodies of international scholarship are relevant for the empirical question at hand. 
One is the research on homeownership and asset-based welfare. The other is classical 
assimilation and locational attainment theory from immigration studies. Due to different 
conceptualizations of housing and welfare citizenship, they hypothesize opposite 
relationships between homeownership and welfare participation. 
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The asset-based approach to welfare provision is a governance model based on 
the theoretical underpinning that housing is “a complex welfare good that supplements 
and mediates the flow of other welfare goods and services at the household level” 
(Doling and Ronald, 2010: p. 166) and what Torgersen (1988) termed “wobbly pillar 
under the welfare state”. It is typically characterized by implementation of pro-
homeownership policies, deregulation of financial markets, and reduction in public 
spending. The ideology had originated in the UK, gained popularity within and beyond, 
and led to a proliferation of market-oriented housing policies in a number of countries. 
This was joined by widespread neoliberal restructuring of welfare systems (Rolnik, 
2013; Belfrage, 2008). Individualization of risks through asset-based welfare is 
particularly relevant for post-socialist transitional countries, many of which saw high 
homeownership rates following privatization and commodification of public housing 
and dramatic reduction in public welfare budgets (Mandic, 2010). A parallel discussion 
on asset-building in developing countries treats housing as a pivotal household resource 
that can compensate for low levels of welfare. The normative implications of asset-
based welfare are controversial, with some arguing for its ability to address serious 
deficits in welfare provision and others raising doubts about its sustainability and 
equitability (Izuhara, 2016; Walks, 2016).  
The empirical hypothesis, assuming an asset-based welfare system, is that at the 
household level, homeownership and participation in social security – especially 
pensions – tend to be inversely related via a substitution or trade-off effect. Housing is 
a critical component of welfare strategies for homeowners (Soaita et al., 2017; Toussaint 
and Elsinga, 2009). The state’s retreat from redistributive welfare in the context of 
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austerity makes housing acquisition even more imperative (Ronald and Kadi, 2017). For 
aging societies, it is believed that housing wealth can be tapped to compensate for 
declining revenue following the retirement of baby boomers (De Decker and Dewilde, 
2010; Malpass, 2007).  
The actual findings are mixed and context-dependent, varying according to 
demographics, characteristics of the housing stock, financing mechanisms, and so on 
(Doling and Ronald, 2010). For example, Engelhardt (2008) found the increase in 
homeownership among the elderly in the US almost entirely attributable to rise in social 
security benefits. By contrast, Torricelli et al. (2016) found that for Italy, 
homeownership is negatively associated with participation in pension schemes in spite 
of new incentives to participate and fluctuations in the housing market. Dewilde and 
Raeymaeckers (2008) found evidence of both the trade-off effect and double 
disadvantage experienced by people without owned housing or pensions.  
The literature on immigrant homeownership offers a contrasting perspective. 
Focusing on indicators of assimilation, this group of studies typically attributes 
variations in homeownership rates across and within immigrant groups to the degree of 
socioeconomic and institutional integration (Alba and Logan, 1992). Empirically, 
citizenship status has been consistently shown to be a significant predictor for 
homeownership (e.g. Vono-de-Vilhena, 2012). In the US context, a person’s legal status 
also matters for homeownership, as it affects access to educational opportunities, 
financial resources, and welfare benefits (McConnell, 2015). Furthermore, longer 
duration of stay in host countries has also been found to be associated with higher degree 
of assimilation and therefore higher likelihood of homeownership (Mundra and Oyelere, 
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2017). All three factors – citizenship, legal status, and duration of stay – indicates the 
permanence of settlement and security of livelihoods. Because having access to social 
welfare enhances security and encourages assimilation, the empirical hypothesis is that 
it should be associated to higher likelihood of homeownership – especially for people 
with foreign origins. 
 
Housing and Welfare in China 
In China, as elsewhere, there are large between-group differences in homeownership 
rates. One of the most significant differences is that between urban local residents and 
rural migrants. The latter group tends to be poorer and less familiar with city life, so the 
process of assimilation is more difficult. Rural migrants are frequently compared to 
international immigrants with a semi-legal status: They are permitted to be in the cities 
but not guaranteed all basic rights and services (Roberts, 1997). Most directly relevant 
to questions of housing ownership are two factors. The lack of local hukou almost 
always prevents migrants from accessing many affordable housing policies. Second, 
non-locals are much less likely to benefit from inter-generational transfer of housing 
ownership than are locals (Cui et al., 2016). 
The debate on migrant homeownership largely revolves around the impact of 
institutional factors relative to socioeconomic factors. Some researchers argued that as 
market transition theory predicts, individual life-cycle factors such as age, education 
attainment, and wealth are becoming more important. This is especially true in smaller 
cities where hukou status does not make as much of a difference (Huang et al., 2014). 
In these locales with fewer institutional hurdles, migrants have adapted and found other 
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ways to settle down (Yang and Guo, 2018; Tao et al., 2015). Others maintain that 
institutional barriers are the main reason for low homeownership rate. Sampling 
migrants from six large Chinese cities, Fang and Zhang (2016) demonstrated that not 
only does hukou status still have a decisively limiting effect on homeownership, but 
access to urban health insurance is also significant. Using an earlier iteration of the 
CHFS survey, Wu and Zhang (2018) evaluated a number of other institutions, such as 
urban social insurance access and rural land rights. They argue that because a person’s 
hukou status is tied up with these institutions, it is still indirectly responsible for making 
it difficult for migrants to purchase homes in the city.  
Researchers have begun to isolate social security as an independent predictor of 
homeownership because urban social insurance has become accessible to wider 
segments of the rural migrant population (Huang et al., 2017). Figure 3.1 shows this 
trend between 2011 and 2015 according to the CHFS survey. To clarify, there are still 
separate schemes for urban and rural residents, employees and non-employees, public 
sector and private sector employees—the former of each pair of population groups 
privileged over the latter in benefit levels5. However, rural migrant workers may be 
entitled to urban, employment-based social security such as basic pensions and medical 
insurance for employees, unemployment insurance, work injury compensation, 
maternity insurance, housing provident fund, and other forms of welfare, depending on 
the specific arrangements with their employers. Any shortfalls on the employer’s side 
                                                 
5 Take pensions as an example: The disparity in income replacement rate is largest between urban civil 
servants and rural residents on basic pensions for peasants. The latter is so low (30%–40% at best) that 
young people do not feel incentivized to participate, according to the IZA conference paper “Incentive 
problems in China’s New Rural Pension program” (2011) by Lei, X., Zhang, C., and Zhao Y. Accessed 
from: http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/CIER2011/ lei_x6071.pdf. 
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are supposedly covered by the state. To address the problems of employer non-
compliance with social insurance law that legally entitles workers and the low coverage 
of the irregularly-employed, the government has created residency-based schemes that 
depend primarily on individual contributions and state subsidies, which have been 
credited for a dramatic increase in medical insurance coverage6. Enrolling in these, 
however, requires local hukou registration. Overall, the urban/rural divide in pensions 
and health insurance can be expected to decline with the eventual unification of urban 
and rural schemes. The state is also moving toward making public sector employees 
contribute more rather than rely entirely on government subsidies 7 . Geographical 
restrictions, on the other hand, remain in effect by means of the hukou system, at least 
at the time of survey: Migrants often encounter difficulties accessing and transferring 
benefits across localities (Gao et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 3.1 – Social insurance by type and hukou status by participation rate 
 
                                                 
6 China Labor Bulletin. Accessed from: https://clb.org.hk/content/china%E2%80%99s-social-security-
system, on 6/1/2019. 
7 State Council Decision on Reforming Pension System for Public Sector Employees (2015). Accessed 
from: 
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/dongtaixinwen/shizhengyaowen/201501/t20150114_148951.
htm on 6/19/2019. 
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These reforms have weakened or altered the link between the hukou system and 
social security. While some studies (e.g., Wu and Wang, 2014) found having a rural 
hukou status negatively affects participation in pensions, health insurance, and 
unemployment insurance, others found that the presence/absence of a labor contract 
outweighs hukou status in social insurance participation (Cheng et al., 2014; Gao et al., 
2012). On the other hand, hukou status does affect other employment outcomes, such 
as educational disparity, labor market segmentation, and workplace discrimination 
(Demurger et al., 2009; Song, 2014). These outcomes do affect access to welfare. Wang 
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(2011) argued that most migrants find employment in private firms, which are more 
likely than state-owned firms to evade compliance of social insurance mandates by 
informalizing employment. Migrants also tend to be less knowledgeable about welfare 
programs or less willing to participate in them (Xu et al., 2011). The findings from 
research on the settlement intention of rural migrants suggest an answer as to the 
relationship between homeownership and access to welfare. Even though settlement 
intention is not exactly the same as homeownership, it is a precursor and a response: 
Migrants make house-buying decisions based on whether they intend to stay (Wu, 
2004). Research on migrants in mega-cities such as Beijing showed that settlement 
intention is not as high as expected (Fan, 2011; Fan et al., 2011). Being excluded 
socially, spatially, and institutionally compels migrants to purchase homes anywhere 
but in the destination cities, even if they do not plan on moving into them soon (Zhan, 
2015). Studies cited in the previous chapter have consistently shown that stronger 
integration in a host society contributes to a stronger inclination to stay (e.g. Zhu and 
Chen, 2010; Tan et al., 2017; Cao et al., 2015). The causality appears to be two-way: 
People who intend to stay seek out better housing conditions (Xie and Chen, 2018; Liu 
et al., 2017; Zhou, 2018). These findings suggest that assimilation outcomes may be 
more important than welfare-substitution effects for China’s rural migrants, who are 
somewhat uniquely situated due to the hukou system. 
 
Hypothesis 
I expect that homeownership would not reflect a substitution effect for welfare because 
rural migrants suffer from double disadvantage in both. They do not benefit from most 
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urban-based pro-homeownership measures. Their generally poor financial situation – 
another consequence of China’s long-standing institutional exclusion – means that 
much of the commercial housing market is over-budget, and that they have no access to 
credits and loans. On the other hand, having social insurance in the city can mitigate the 
risks of migration and urban living. Otherwise, loss of job or home, major injuries and 
illnesses, and old age are just some of the things that could send migrants packing. 
Migrants are likely less willing or able to invest in housing when they are concerned 
about losing their urban livelihoods or having to save up money for contingencies. For 
these reasons, I hypothesize a positive relationship between access to urban social 
insurance and homeownership.  
It is important to stress that this test does not convey information about causality. 
Wu and Xiao (2018) suggested that settlement intention does not always result in higher 
likelihood of social insurance participation. This may or may not extend to 
homeownership which, like welfare citizenship, is an indicator of socioeconomic 
integration. Time-series data are needed to confirm causality – to show, for example, 
whether housing purchase follows social insurance registration or it is the other way 
around. Nevertheless, knowing the association is also useful, because for migrants, the 
ability to purchase a home in the city may not be at all related to their employment or 
welfare status within that city: the wealth may have been accumulated elsewhere, or it 
may be preferable to maintain their access to rural benefits for the sake of left-behind 
family members or future retirement. A positive association, on the other hand, would 
at least open up the possibility that there exists a causal relationship as well.   
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Data and Model Specification 
The 2015 CHFS is one of the most informative datasets currently in existence. It uses 
three-stage random probability proportional to size sampling for counties (districts, 
county-level cities), residential communities, and households. 29 provinces are 
represented. It consists of three separate datasets: the first contains household-level 
information on assets and wealth; the second contains individual-level demographic 
information including social insurance participation – for all individuals nested in the 
households; the third contains geographical information on the interview site at the 
household level, including the province, region, and urban/rural designation.  
The sub-sample used in this analysis includes households surveyed in urban 
areas based on the information on urban/rural designation provided in the third dataset. 
Using information about hukou status in the second dataset, the “rural migrant” is 
identified as a person whose hukou status is classified as rural or agricultural and 
registered in a location (county or district) that is different from the one in which he or 
she regularly resides. To reflect the connectedness of decision-making by household 
members and the trans-locational nature of many migrant families, all households with 
at least one rural migrant are included, except for households in which none of the rural 
migrants reside in the survey city. The survey respondent by design is a long-term 
resident of at least six months. The final sample for the model has 1,736 households 
with 6,244 individuals. 
The analysis uses multilevel binary logistic regression with robust errors on the 
dependent variable “homeownership”. This dependent variable is coded 1 if the 
household owns a home in the survey city and 0 otherwise. In the vast majority of the 
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cases, this property is also the household’s primary residence. This measure for 
homeownership is chosen because it can be linked, location-wise, to the independent 
variables via the survey city. Individual social insurance participation is aggregated at 
the household level to match homeownership. Where location is important, I include 
only the household members residing with the survey respondent in the aggregate 
measure, since household members living elsewhere do not contribute to the 
household’s institutional integration in the survey city.   
The main set of explanatory variables is participation in social insurance, 
measured as the number of household members enrolled in pensions, health insurance, 
unemployment insurance, work injury compensation, maternity insurance, and housing 
provident fund – coded 1 or 0 for each household member and summed at the household 
level. At the individual level, “pensions” is coded 1 for a household member residing in 
the survey city if he or she is enrolled in any of the government’s sponsored urban 
schemes. These can include (translated literally from Chinese) retirement pay for 
employees in government agencies and public institutions, basic pensions for urban 
employees, basic pensions for urban residents, basic pensions for rural residents, or 
merged basic pensions for urban and rural residents. The last one was uncommon at the 
time of the survey as it was an experiment in reducing urban-rural disparity.  
The binary variable for health insurance is coded 1 (at the individual level) if 
enrollment or registration in the primary type of health insurance (in the event that a 
person is enrolled in multiple schemes) is processed in the survey city and 0 otherwise, 
for all schemes and for all household members, regardless of residential location. Like 
pensions, health insurance schemes include public (state) healthcare, basic health 
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insurance for urban employees, basic health insurance for urban residents, and so on. 
The most common scheme for rural migrants is called “new cooperative health 
insurance for villages”. The number of people enrolled in other health insurance 
schemes, including commercial health insurance, is negligibly small to zero in the sub-
sample.  
Enrollment in residence-based health insurance typically requires local hukou 
registration. Rural migrants without access to basic health insurance for urban 
employees still need to rely on the inferior rural insurance. While getting reimbursement 
is possible for receiving care in a different city, there are many limitations (at the time 
of the survey). Reimbursement can only be processed in certain designated hospitals, 
and the amount of reimbursement is based on policies in the place where one is 
registered rather than the place where one receives care. This is the reason that only the 
location of registration for health insurance is considered.  
Other insurance schemes such as unemployment, compensation for work 
injuries, maternity, and housing are relatively minor compared to pensions and health 
insurance. For these variables, only household members living in the survey city are 
included in the aggregate household-level measure. At the individual level, enrollment 
in each scheme is coded 1.  
The controlled factors also include a set of variables to account for connections 
to localities. Engaging in agricultural production and enrollment in health insurance 
elsewhere indicate ties to rural origins. Because permanent or long-term migrants tend 
to migrate within the provincial borders, the proportion of intraprovincial migrants in a 
household can be important. Households that are split in separate locations are less 
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likely to commit to settling down, so a binary variable is used to indicate split 
households. Some previous studies include “living with spouse” and “living with 
school-age children” but the results are inconclusive. Fang and Zhang (2016) found that 
these are positively and significantly related to homeownership, while Wu and Zhang 
(2018) found the opposite for children in megacities and no significance in the full 
model. One reason for this discrepancy, besides different model specification and 
sample selection, is that situations involving children in reality are extremely 
complicated because of China’s education system and the hukou. Children at different 
ages may be more or less likely to reside with migrant parents, and it is unclear how that 
affects housing tenure. While parents may not purchase a house in the city if their 
children cannot join them, this does not imply that childless adults (also coded 0 for 
“living with school-age children”) are less likely to purchase a house. Parents may also 
purchase a house in anticipation of transferring children to city schools in the future. 
Housing tenure decision by couples living together in the city also involves many 
different considerations at different points in the life course. For these reasons, a single 
binary variable denoting split households is used here to capture both “living with 
spouse” and “living with children”, with 1 indicating that one or more household 
members does not reside with the survey respondent. 
Additionally, the model controls for demographics, household income, and 
employment. Demographic variables include the age and sex of the household head, as 
well as average education attainment for all adults in the household. Employment 
variables include the number of household members employed in the public sector, 
having a work contract, working a temporary or informal job, working as farmers, and 
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self-employed. While employment status is related to social insurance participation, this 
does not preclude the distinct possibility of self-employed or informally employed 
individuals purchasing their own social (not commercial) insurance without the aid of 
an employer. The number of employees or “breadwinners” in the household is 
controlled for.  
Finally, the ‘region’ variable refers to the eastern, central, and western regions 
of China, designated 1 (baseline), 2, and 3, respectively. Various sources may group the 
northeastern provinces differently. According to the data usage manual of this particular 
survey, the eastern region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan; the central region includes 
Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan; the western 
region includes Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia. This grouping is consistent with the generalization that 
eastern provinces are the most developed, followed by central provinces, followed by 
western provinces. Since it is not critical to the study to know which cities or provinces 
exhibit higher to lower homeownership rates, city-level and provincial-level variations 
as random effects, with the exception of city median housing price, which is calculated 
from the full sample.  
 
Empirical Results 
Table 3.1 shows descriptive information for the key variables. A comparison is made 
between mixed-status households and households consisting solely of rural migrants. It 
is clear that the latter are more advantaged across the board – housing ownership, 
 61 
education, income, secure employment, and social insurance participation. 22.6% of 
rural migrant households own housing in the survey city, compared to 52.5% for mixed-
status households. Mixed-status households have much higher income – approximately 
120,000 RMB yuan compared to only 77,000 RMB yuan for rural migrant households. 
These advantages reflect the contribution by local residents and urban migrants in the 
household. 
Table 3.1 Descriptive information for key variables 
Data Source: 2015 China Household Finance Survey. 
Key Variables Rural 
migrant 
Mixed-
status 
Owns a home in city of residence (% of households) 22.6 52.5 
Urban Social Insurance (% of households)   
    At least one household member has…   
        … urban pensions  31.5 64.5 
        … local health insurance  33.1 60.3 
        … unemployment insurance  23.6 38.6 
        … work injury compensation  26.6 40.3 
        … maternity insurance  19.5 35.1 
        … housing provident fund  15.1 33.9 
Household Characteristics/Demographics 
  
    Age of household head  37.4 40.0 
    Household head is female (%) 31.9 38.1 
    Household size 2.76 3.86 
    Education among adults (3=junior high school; 4=senior high school) 3.5 3.9 
    Mean household income  77,156 120,080 
Employment (% of households)   
    At least one household member is…   
        … employed in the public sectors 11.7 24.6 
        … employed with a formal contract 34.7 51.6 
        … working a temporary job 22.7 17.5 
        … employed as a farmer 0.7 0.4 
        … self-employed 22.0 20.6 
Urban/rural ties, settlement (% of households) 
  
    At least one intra-provincial migrant 50.2 43.1 
    Split household 8.5 29.7 
    Household engaged in agricultural production last year 8.8 8.8 
    At least one household member has health insurance elsewhere 62.8 64.1 
N 1046 690 
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For employment and social insurance participation, table 1 presents a modified measure 
that shows the proportion of households with at least one person working in the public 
sector, working informally, having health insurance, and so on. Subtracting from 1 
produces the proportion of households without, for instance, any social insurance. Rural 
migrant households are more disadvantaged in terms of pensions, health insurance, and 
housing fund than unemployment insurance, work injury compensation, and maternity 
insurance, in comparison with mixed-status household. 68% of rural migrant 
households are without pensions, and nearly that many have no health insurance for any 
household member – compared to less than 40% for mixed-status households.  
51.6% of mixed-status households have at least one person working under a 
formal contract, compared to 34.7% for rural migrant households. Rural migrants are 
slightly more likely to be self-employed or work as farmers. Mixed-status households 
are less likely to reside together and engage more interprovincial migration, probably 
due to a combination of in-migrating and outgoing household members.  
Breaking down the data geographically shows that housing ownership is higher 
in central and western regions, which is expected as these are generally migrant-
sourcing regions with less expensive real estate. 20%, 38%, and 23% of the households 
without any urbanites own a home in eastern, central, and western region,  respectively. 
These regions also, unsurprisingly, show higher prevalence of intra-provincial 
migration. The more developed eastern region exhibits the highest level of social 
insurance participation, with the exception of medical insurance, which is the highest 
for rural migrant households in the central region. Even though rural migrant households 
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are disadvantaged compared to mixed-status households, the regional disparities in 
terms of employment, social insurance participation, and homeownership are much 
more severe for mixed-status households than for rural migrant households, suggesting 
that having an urban hukou in the eastern region carries more weight than in the interior 
regions. 
Table 2 shows the coefficients and odds ratios from regression analysis. The 
sustained importance of hukou is evident in the results for percentage of local residents 
in the household and percentage of rural migrants in the household, which are, 
respectively, positively and negatively related to housing ownership. The positive and 
significant associations between age, education, household size, household income and 
housing ownership are in agreement with established findings. These associations 
reflect the importance of life cycle and assimilation factors for housing ownership and 
have been universally demonstrated across many different contexts. 
For social insurance participation, having urban pension and health insurance in 
the survey city contribute to housing ownership. One additional household member with 
pensions and health insurance is associated with a 37% and 17.3% likelihood increase 
for housing ownership, respectively. These associations are significant even after 
controlling for hukou status. On the other hand, no significant associations are found for 
unemployment insurance, work injury compensation, maternity insurance, and housing 
fund, although the positive directions (or signs) are as hypothesized. The results for 
social security confirm the findings from earlier studies by Fang and Zhang (2016), Wu 
and Zhang (2018), and Huang et al. (2014).  
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Table 3.2 Regression results for homeownership 
 
*** p<0.01, ** 0.01<= p<0.05, * 0.05<=p<0.1 
 Data source: 2015 China Household Survey 
 
Dependent variable: own a house in the survey (residence) city Coefficient/Odds ratio (p-
value)  
Access to social insurance in the city of residence  
    Number of household members enrolled in …  
        … urban pension + 0.370/1.447 (0.011) ** 
        … local health insurance + 0.173/1.188 (0.000) *** 
        … unemployment insurance + 0.187/1.206 (0.307) 
        … work injury compensation + 0.089/1.093 (0.735) 
        … maternity insurance + 0.015/1.015 (0.906) 
        … housing provident fund + 0.060/1.062 (0.641) 
Household characteristics/Demographics  
    Percentage of household members with this city’s urban 
hukou 
+ 2.507/12.273 (0.000) *** 
    Percentage of rural migrants in the household - 0.798/0.450 (0.049) ** 
    Age of household head + 0.027/1.028 (0.000) *** 
    Household head is female: 1=yes; 0=no - 0.047/0.954 (0.668) 
    Household size + 0.313/1.368 (0.000) *** 
    Education attainment among adults + 0.126/1.134 (0.006) *** 
    Household income (10,000 yuan) + 0.008/1.008 (0.053) * 
Employment  
    Number of employees in the household - 0.277/0.758 (0.426)  
    Number of household members working in public sectors + 0.025/1.025 (0.864) 
    Number of household members employed by contract - 0.357/0.700 (0.330)  
    Number of household members working temporary jobs - 0.283/0.754 (0.483) 
    Number of household members working as farmers + 0.983/2.673 (0.292) 
    Number of self-employed household members + 0.236/1.266 (0.484) 
Urban/rural ties (settlement)  
    Percentage of intra-provincial migrants in the household + 0.665/1.924 (0.001) *** 
    Split household: 1=yes; 0=no - 0.675/0.509 (0.000) *** 
    Engaged in agricultural production last year: 1=yes; 0=no - 0.344/0.709 (0.159)  
    Number of household members with nonlocal health 
insurance  
- 0.140/0.870 (0.003) *** 
Region (eastern = baseline)  
    2 = central + 0.626/1.704 (0.030) ** 
    3 = western + 0.198/1.125 (0.691) 
Median housing price (10,000 yuan) - 0.002/0.997 (0.413) 
Province random effect 1.70e-31 (S.E. 2.98e-30) 
City random effect 0.529 (S.E. 0.197) 
N 1,736 
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It is somewhat surprising that employment factors do not appear important. This 
agrees with a previous finding (Chen and Liu, 2016) that labor market status is not 
related to settlement intentions. However, estimating a partial model consisting only of 
employment variables changes the picture (table omitted due to space limit and available 
upon request). In the partial model, one more household member working in the public 
sector makes the household 50% more likely to own housing. Self-employment raises 
the likelihood of homeownership by 65%. This agrees with the existing literature 
arguing that entrepreneurship and self-employment contribute to stronger settlement 
intention by increasing contact with locals and foster a sense of belonging and 
commitment. Having a signed work contract raises the likelihood of homeownership, 
while working at a temporary job lowers it. The significance of these associations 
disappears with the addition of hukou, demographic, socioeconomic, and social 
insurance variables. Fang and Zhang (2016), by contrast, found a significant and 
positive relationship between job with contract and housing ownership, but none for age 
and education of the household head.   
For the last group of variables, intra-provincial migration is associated with 
higher probability of housing ownership, as does co-habitancy of household members 
in the same city. Migrating within the provincial borders typically crosses lower 
economic and cultural barriers (Wang and Fan, 2012) and shorter distance from home, 
which makes permanent settlement easier. Household members living together in the 
city increases the level of social and emotional attachment to that city. Conversely, 
having one’s primary health insurance elsewhere decreases the likelihood of housing 
ownership in the survey city. Engaging in agricultural production is negatively 
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associated with housing ownership in the city, but the effect is not significant. 
Geographically, housing ownership is 87% more likely for migrants living in the central 
region. In a single-level logistic regression without city and provincial random effects, 
both central and western regions are significantly associated with higher housing 
ownership, as expected for places with cheaper real estate. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Both housing ownership and social insurance coverage for China’s rural migrants have 
risen over the years and are increasingly disconnected with hukou status. Previous 
studies are inconclusive about which factors affect decisions about settlement and 
housing, and to what extent (Liu et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2017). One reason for the 
disagreement is that they draw from different, localized samples. The present study 
takes advantage of a nationally representative survey conducted recently during a time 
marked by large strides forward in the area of social security. The regression analysis 
shows that social insurance participation is associated with higher likelihood of 
homeownership for rural migrant households after controlling for other contributing 
factors. 
This result suggests that the locational attainment model as it is used in 
immigration studies is a viable framework for analyzing homeownership for China’s 
internal migrants. The framework assumes the existence of persistent structural barriers 
between the migrant population and the host society as well as the importance of intra-
group differences in personal resources—such as wealth and human capital—in 
determining housing outcomes. It hypothesizes that economic, social, and institutional 
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integration of migrants positively influences their upward residential mobility. In this 
study, citizenship status, welfare access, and assimilation factors (i.e., socioeconomic 
and life-cycle characteristics of individuals and households) were found to be significant 
predictors for migrant homeownership. Since migrants still face limitations in receiving 
subsidized healthcare in their destination city, it makes sense that the locational 
restriction on accessing medical insurance benefits matters and shows up in the 
regression as a significant institutional barrier. 
Based on these findings, I argue that rural migrants are often not committed to 
settling down in destination cities because their non-local and non-urban hukou status 
circumscribes their rights as welfare citizens and introduces a major source of precarity. 
In order to encourage homeownership and asset-building, policies should aim to expand 
social security for migrant workers and their families. For proof of causality, however, 
time-series analysis is needed. The cross-sectional analysis only shows that families 
with urban hukou holders were advantaged in both housing and social security. Another 
limitation is that there is incomplete information in the dataset about where migrants 
come from. It is likely that migrants moving from rural areas in the eastern region to 
urban areas in the western region would exhibit different patterns than those moving in 
the other direction. Finally, because this survey is conducted by residential grid 
sampling, rural migrants as a group may be under-sampled since they tend to be more 
concentrated in enclave neighborhoods, where cheap rentals and informal jobs are 
common. This means that the number captured here is an estimate for the upper limit, 
and that the actual levels of housing ownership and social insurance participation among 
migrants are even lower.  
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Some regional implications can be drawn from the regression results. First, 
intraprovincial migration is positively associated with homeownership. For rural 
migrants originated in interior regions, the cities in their province are usually more 
affordable. Social security benefits are also easier to transfer within a province than 
across different provinces. Cultural and cost barriers to migration are also subject to the 
same provincial border effects. An unexpected finding is that employment-related 
factors do not matter in the presence of other more impactful variables. From the 
descriptive analysis, it appears that the eastern region which receives migrants has the 
highest social insurance participation but lowest housing ownership. This suggests that 
housing prices are prohibitively high and/or settlement intention is low. This disconnect 
between secure employment and homeownership may well be specific to the migrant 
population, though this requires further investigation: Liu and Xu (2017), for example, 
found that temporary migration is eastward where employment opportunities are, while 
permanent migration tends to be concentrated in the interior.  
Overall, the homeownership rate for migrants is still quite low, and social 
insurance coverage also has much room for improvement. Rural migrant families are 
completely situated outside of state protection. The many progressive legislations on 
the social security front are counteracted by the informalization of labor. Moreover, 
although migrants are legally entitled to access urban social insurance, they are 
prevented by other practical constraints, such as the precarious nature of employment, 
inability to afford the cost, or lack of knowledge about their rights and options. Zhang 
et al. (2019) demonstrated that public expenditure on social security for people with 
relatively low human capital generates high benefits for sustained economic growth. To 
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achieve socially and economically sustainable urbanization, in the coming years, this 
disadvantaged group needs to be the target for continued social security and affordable 
housing reforms. 
In the years after the survey was conducted, there have been moves by the 
government to accelerate the merging of urban and rural residence-based social 
insurance and implementation of a single social security card that can be used anywhere 
in the country. Such improvement in flexibility can potentially broaden migration and 
settlement options for migrants. Regression results here show that family separation is 
not conducive to settlement and housing ownership. Since children’s eligibility to enroll 
in health insurance typically depends on the enrollment status of their parents, 
expanding social insurance coverage not only helps the working adults but also supports 
other family members. Considering that employment outcomes (besides wage) are 
insignificant and that many rural migrants work informally, more options for pensions 
and health insurance should be made accessible without the need for employer 
contribution. Finally, interior cities are more promising places to concentrate efforts on 
expanding welfare because they are less costly and easier to navigate for intraprovincial 
migrants. The next chapter continues the analysis on these as sites of urbanization. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MIGRATION CHRONICLES IN EMERGING CITIES 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter examines migration dynamics in Guizhou province by triangulating 
statistics, documents, and narratives. The province is one of the least developed and 
urbanized in China but has been growing in leaps and bounds in recent years due to 
investment from the central government. Indeed, if there was an award for “most 
improved” region in China, Guizhou would arguably be a deserving recipient. Though 
still developmentally behind most other places in the country, its rate of growth in GDP, 
population, and urban construction over the past decade often topped the national charts. 
For example, Guizhou has maintained a double-digit growth in GDP in the past decade 
as the national growth stagnated. In 2017, it ranked highest in the country. Long-time 
local residents unanimously reported palpable improvements in urban amenities, 
transportation infrastructure, and standards of living. The establishment of a national-
level new development area in 2013 in the rural interstice of two prefectures led to 
remarkable transformations in the province’s peripheral regions.  
 In contrast to the previous chapter, this one focuses on urban settlement at the 
micro level in a single region. It offers glimpses of the dynamics of incoming and local 
migration and varying experiences in different cities from the perspectives of migrants 
themselves. Here, I continue to build on the previously-discussed literature on 
settlement intention and destination choice of China’s migrants but with a focus on 
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emerging cities, and engage with the international literature on the impact of peripheral 
development on migration. The disagreement about how policy changes affect 
individual migration decisions is in some ways rooted in the irreducibility of structure 
and agency. Guizhou is a valuable case study for contributing to this conversation due 
to the strong relevance of rural development and intraprovincial migration, which tends 
to be more permanent and more demonstrative of the connections between origin and 
destination. It also serves to advance the discussion on China’s ordinary inland cities; 
to date, knowledge production on these places is very much lacking. 
The main question investigated in this chapter is how development policies – 
including the ones that resulted in its underdevelopment – affect individual migration 
experiences and outcomes. The next section reviews the literature. The third section 
provides an overview of macro level migration statistics to show the rising importance 
of inland destination and justify my choice of case study. The fourth section profiles 
Guizhou in terms of policies, places, and people and offers a multi-faceted analysis of 
the urbanization dynamics. To accomplish the research objectives in this chapter and 
the next, I conducted 74 interviews through a combination of snowballing and 
convenience sampling, including 23 migrant households in urban districts, counties, 
towns, townships, and villages within the large provincial capital of Guiyang, the small 
prefectural city of Anshun, and the urban-rural interface in Guian (an amalgamation of 
the two city names) New Area which contains parts of both cities. Histories of economic 
development in the chosen sites are obtained from official plans and a series of domestic 
research publications called “skin books” produced by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences. The chapter concludes with a broader discussion on the implications of 
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interior cities for equitable growth and prefaces the next chapter that specifically 
addresses the issue of educational equity.  
 
Emerging Cities Literature 
What little literature there is on China’s emerging cities suggests that these cities have 
potential for not only absorbing migrants but also doing it in a less myopic way than 
their more established counterparts (Mackenzie, 2002; Yang and Gallagher, 2017). 
There are two separate issues at hand that are important for policy: whether investing in 
smaller cities can divert migration, and whether they can be made more inclusive. The 
previous chapters touched on some scholars’ skepticism about the central government’s 
effort to lure people away from mega-cities. Critics mainly focused their objection on 
the limited scope of hukou reforms, which they argued is not enough to affect migrants’ 
preference for large cities (Zhang, 2011; Chen and Fan, 2016). Other studies, however, 
showed that the answer is more complex as a multitude of factors enters into migration 
decisions (He et al., 2017).  
As for equity implications, emerging cities in the interior are growing in a time 
marked by greater awareness for sustainability, upscaling of governance, and emphasis 
on balanced development (Li et al., 2014; Wu, 2017; Yi and Wu, 2018). Inland mega-
cities Chengdu and Chongqing blazed the trail for others by implementing a more 
coordinated development model that prioritizes migrant rights, urban-rural integration, 
endogenous growth, and quality of life (Cai et al., 2012; Chen and Gao, 2011; Ye, Qin, 
and LeGates, 2013; Cui, 2011; Cheng, 2013). A case study on Hefei showed that 
national policies played a significant role in the impressive growth of this regional 
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center in the otherwise underdeveloped migrant-sourcing province of Anhui (Zhao and 
Zou, 2018). Recentralization of governance is also evident in the recent proliferation of 
large development zones and expansive city-regions (Li, 2015). This form of integrated 
development is based on a “leave no one behind” principle. Finally, the WDS has 
resulted in substantial improvements in transportation, energy, and information 
infrastructure in the interior ((Lai, 2002; Shiu et al., 2016). Accompanying the 
improvements in infrastructure, there have also been a series of programs to support 
small towns and villages, which spurred the expansion of rural non-farm sector, in-situ 
urbanization, and occupational transition. However, studies found new inequalities 
being produced in this process as government compensation for land appropriation is 
relatively insignificant compared to the type of employment migrants were previously 
trained for, meaning that some people lose more than they gain (Song et al., 2018).    
The impact of these new developments in China’s interior on migration 
dynamics is not yet well-understood. Focusing on labor policies, Yang and Gallagher 
(2017) argued that local governments in inland provinces are more inclined to be 
inclusive because they use local (intraprovincial) labor force, unlike coastal mega-cities 
that grew by exploiting migrant workers from far away. This implicates entirely 
different dynamics between the state and workers: “The incentives and expectations of 
all three actors – firms, workers, and local governments – may be different under 
conditions of longer time horizons, less mobility, and greater social and cultural 
integration of migrants and local residents” (p. 161). Compared to interprovincial 
migrants who go for large cities, a greater proportion of intraprovincial migrants go to 
small cities. Although employment opportunities tend to be more limited, studies have 
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shown that migrants’ quality of life and satisfaction level are the highest in small – but 
not too small – cities, because housing and public services are more easily accessible 
(Chen et al., 2015). 
 The literature in the international context is also divided on the subject. Early 
on, scholars have suggested that the only fundamental solution to unconstrained 
metropolitan growth is through economic development policies that attract workforce 
to less crowded areas including less developed regions, small cities, secondary towns, 
and villages (Stark, 1980; Todaro, 1980; Simmons, 1981). However, empirical studies 
generally do not support the idea that peripheral development can resolve core 
metropolitan problems. Investment in transportation infrastructure, agricultural 
modernization, rural-urban integrated management, and education have been found to 
increase emigration in the long run (Rhoda, 1983; Massey, 1992; Becker et al., 1994; 
Beauchemin and Schoumaker, 2005; Bakewell, 2008; Das, 2015). In more recent years, 
studies have found that urbanization in secondary towns can play a bigger role in 
poverty reduction and inclusive growth for rural migrants than large urban 
agglomerations (Christiaensen and Todo, 2014; Gibson et al., 2017; Ingelaere et al., 
2018). On the other hand, strategies to develop backward areas have also been criticized 
on the ground of their “sedentary bias” that, by incentivizing people to stay closer to 
home, disregards mobility as essential to freedom and good life (Bakewell, 2008; 
Castles, 2009).  
 To answer the question of whether small cities aid in more balanced growth 
requires first understanding their dynamics – to which my case study contributes. This 
chapter assesses policy implementation from the perspective of target groups – i.e. the 
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extent to which developmental contexts have bearing on migration decisions and 
experiences. Before I delve into how policies shape people’s decisions, I highlight the 
recent migration patterns suggesting a rise in intraprovincial migration and the 
importance of interior destinations. 
 
The Rise of Inland Destinations 
In 2008, the National Bureau of Statistics established a nationwide monitoring system 
specifically to keep track of migrant workers who originated from rural areas. Data 
collection began in the villages with a sampling of households registered in villages 
with one or more members no longer working on the farm. Every year since then, an 
annual report was published on migration trends and migrants’ living conditions in the 
city, including employment, housing, education, and social integration. One of the latest 
trends shown in these reports is that migration distances are shortening. For example, 
the proportion of local migrants, or people who work off-farm jobs in the same township 
as their hukou registration, has been increasing in a monotonic fashion since 2010 from 
36.7% to 40.0%. Although this is different from migration to cities, it indicates the 
expansion of rural non-agricultural sectors, also sometimes referred to as in-situ 
urbanization. Another example is that the proportion of intraprovincial migration has 
seen consistent rise from 46.7% in 2008 to 55.3% in 2017. The increase is the steepest 
in interior provinces. The magnitude of increase in percentage points is greatest in the 
western region, which speaks to the growth of migrant-sourcing provinces. This trend 
is complemented by counting migrants in the origin and destination. While the number 
of migrants headed for or staying in the eastern region has more or less plateaued since 
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the second half of 2000s, the number of migrants in central and western regions has 
been increasing at, respectively, 2~3% and 4~6% annually during the years of survey. 
At the same time, the supply of migrant workers by eastern, central, and western regions 
has increased by 0.3%, 1.8%, and 3.3%, respectively. This means that the interior is 
seeing both higher labor output and absorption. In fact, migrants from the western region 
accounted for over half of first-time migrants in 2017 which, combined with the rise of 
intraprovincial migration, indicates that western provinces are urbanizing particularly 
fast.  
 These trends can be attributed to changes in macroeconomy, policy, and 
demographics. Migrant labor shortage in export manufacturing zones in the eastern 
region was observed as early as 2004 and puzzled researchers who observed 
simultaneous existence of rural labor surplus (Knight et al., 2011; Wang, 2014). The 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 affected manufacturing and resulted in the 
unemployment of 23 million migrant workers. Many of these workers went home and 
did not return even after economic recovery. In the following year, severe labor shortage 
was reported along the coast (Chan, 2010). In 2009, the number of migrant workers in 
Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta dropped by 7.8% and 22.5%, respectively. 
Meanwhile, WDS received a boost from a government stimulus package in 2009 to 
maintain GDP growth in the Global Recession which created 50 million non-
agricultural jobs primarily in infrastructure construction (Chan, 2010; Cai et al., 2010). 
Many factories in the eastern manufacturing regions around this time relocated inland 
in search of cheaper land and labor. 
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The growing importance of interior cities as sites of urbanization can also be 
inferred from demographic changes in the migrant population. First, new generation 
migrants (born in 1980 or later) became the majority for the first time in 2017. A number 
of studies have found that compared to the older generation, younger migrants are not 
as inclined to resume or take up the farming life. They also tend to be better educated 
and more concerned with their children’s education and well-being such that they prefer 
keeping them close to leaving them behind. As life in first-tier cities is fraught with 
difficulties, migrants may look to less expensive or exclusive cities to settle down and 
purchase housing, as suggested in Chapter 2. Studies found that although net migration 
is eastward, migrants usually settle down in smaller cities and secondary towns closer 
to their origins (Yang et al., 2016; Tan and Hao, 2018). Zang et al. (2015) showed that 
high housing prices in the eastern region discourages migrants from buying a house. 
Older studies showed that permanent migration involving hukou transfer (Hu et al., 
2011) or without hukou transfer (Su et al., 2018) tends to be across short distance and 
intraprovincial. Liu and Xu (2015) found that temporary migrants are found in coastal 
areas with better employment opportunities, while permanent migrants are in south-
central and south-western areas with low city entry barriers. Third, the workforce is 
becoming more feminized due to the rapid growth of service industry relatively to 
manufacturing and construction. At the same time, women are still the primary 
caretakers of elderly parents and other dependents who, in migrant households, often 
get left behind (Liu, 2004). Even though women have more opportunities to find jobs 
off the farm, they may still have to stay relatively close to home in order to continue 
fulfilling their caregiving duties. Moreover, as Chapter 1 discussed, the dominant mode 
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of migration is becoming more family-oriented, and migration aspirations are no longer 
restricted to earnings alone. This implies that the income advantage of traditional 
destinations is shrinking if interior destinations have other things to offer. 
 
Policies, Places, and People 
Historically, Guizhou was part of China’s borderlands. Scholars wrote of the region’s 
wild landscapes and exotic cultures. Starting in the Ming dynasty, the government had 
been moving people there for resettlement and deploying military units for defense. The 
geographical disadvantages of the region were apparent then: A land punctuated by 
mountains was not ideal for the development of agriculture or cities, and the gift of 
frequent precipitation only benefited the very few flat parts. A popular saying thus 
characterized Guizhou: “never three days without rain; never three miles without hills; 
never more than three silvers on a person”. For a long time, Guizhou was rarely a target 
for development, and as a corridor, passageway, and (in the Second World War) 
regional transportation hub that connected surrounding provinces and a destination for 
the resettlement of educated youths during the Cultural Revolution, its growth was 
largely driven by exogenous factors by the process of diffusion.  
Guizhou’s isolation had always been both a blessing and a curse. On the one 
hand, indigenous groups were sheltered from the negative mainstream influences such 
as opium epidemics and certain regressive customs. The pristine landscape was noticed 
by travelers as early as the 1930s as valuable for tourism. At the same time, although 
Guizhou was one of the first places to implement the household responsibility system 
which decollectivized agriculture, its transition into market economy was stalled by a 
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lack of skills and resources. Many remote rural areas were stranded in poverty and 
untouched by the progress of industrialization. Skilled jobs were taken up by migrants 
from nearby provinces, leaving the local workers with hardly anything worthwhile to 
do. Economists in the late 1980s coined the term “Guizhou phenomenon” to summarize 
the range of observations for the province’s severe underdevelopment: large internal 
disparities in natural resources, rapid population growth vis-à-vis deforestation and 
deteriorating farmlands, stunted industrialization, low investment, poverty and low 
savings, and leviathan government institutions.  
This dismal situation took sharp a turn in the 21st century, when the central 
government invested heavily in infrastructure for western China, launched reforestation 
ecological projects, and cracked down on corruption. With these new developments, 
discussions about the potential of Guizhou as a land of energy, minerals, tourism, and 
culture reappeared in policy and public discourses. Attempting to capitalize on 
Guizhou’s comparative advantages in modern industries, planners embraced a kind of 
leap-frogging strategy that centers around a clean, creative, cognitive-cultural economy 
(Yu and Gibbs, 2018). The current underdevelopment was re-framed as a blank slate for 
more comprehensive and integrated development, turning disadvantages into assets.  
  In recent years, Guizhou has grown rapidly. Construction nearly doubled 
between 2004 and 2014. The province has been consistently losing people each year, 
which is unusual even among migrant-sourcing provinces – until 2012. As the rate of 
natural growth has remained more or less the same throughout, this turning point 
indicated a major reversal in the net migration trend: Even though as of now it is still in 
the negative, in-migration is rapidly gaining, having almost doubled since 2010. Out of 
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the one million incoming migrants in Guizhou now,  about 40% live in the provincial 
capital. There are about six million outgoing migrants (which is less than previous 
years), 70% of whom went far to Zhejiang and Guangdong. Overall, people in Guizhou 
are more mobile than a decade ago when 95% of people lived in the same place as their 
hukou registration. Migrants now make up about 15% of Guizhou’s residents, up from 
11.9% in the previous year. About four in five originated from within the province.   
 
Figure 4.1 – Guizhou’s urbanization rate compared to other laggers 
 
 
Guizhou is the second least urbanized province after Tibet: As of 2017, the 
proportion of urban residents is 46%, making it one of the few provinces remaining 
(Guangxi, Yunnan, Gansu, Tibet, and Xinjiang) with more people in villages than in 
cities. Although it urbanization level is low, its urbanization rate is the fastest in the 
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group (Figure 4.1). In 2015, the last year in which information on hukou type was 
collected, 83.6% of people in Guizhou have agricultural hukou, which means that most 
people living regularly in urban areas are not officially registered there. All cities other 
than Guiyang are less than half-urbanized. Guizhou’s mountainous terrain limited the 
size of cities and created sub-optimal distribution of city sizes: Between one large city 
and the abundance of small cities, there is a dearth of medium-sized cities to bridge the 
two. According to State Council’s 2014 definition of city ranks based on the number of 
residents in urban districts 8 , Guizhou only has one large city (the provincial seat 
Guiyang), one medium-sized city (Zunyi), seven small cities, and four tiny cities. Towns 
in Guizhou are also typically more rural in character and governance. 
The progress in terms of social policies has been slow and steady. Social 
insurance coverage has been gradually expanding in recent years. In 2016, Guizhou 
eliminated agricultural/non-agricultural distinction in the hukou system, although the 
hukou status still includes residential location. It is up to the individual city to determine 
the extent to which rural residents within its jurisdiction are entitled to urban services. 
Despite improvements in education, the illiteracy level (and gender inequality) is still 
comparatively high in Guizhou, as is children dependency ratio – most likely a result of 
left-behind children. Most of the province’s resources are devoted to poverty alleviation, 
which involves tracking every single household to determine the amount and type of 
need. Provincial leadership takes this project very seriously and sends people to double-
check whether local officials visited all the households assigned to them. One 
                                                 
8 Mega-cities: > 10 million; extra-large cities: 5-10 million; tier 1 large cities : 3-5 million; tier 2 large 
cities: 1-3 million; medium cities: 0.5-1 million; small cities: 0.2-0.5 million; tiny cities: < 0.2 million. 
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interviewed official told me that he got into a great deal of trouble when one villager 
did not remember his visit when asked by provincial representatives. In the 
investigations that followed, the local official had to produce documents to prove that 
he indeed did not skip on this person (Interview #PB-07, July 8th, 2017). 
 
Guiyang 
Guiyang is a prefectural-level city with six urban districts and three rural counties. It is 
the only city in the province with more urban residents than rural residents – 3.59 and 
1.21 million in 2017, respectively – and, according to the 2010 census, one of the two 
cities in which there are more residents than citizens, making it a migrant destination. 
Only about half of Guiyang’s total residents have an urban hukou. The economy relies 
on tertiary industries; tourism, in particular, is booming. Guiyang has been in the 
national spotlight in recent years, the reason for which can be traced to a 2012 national 
policy designating the city to be a regional center, and one of the national centers, for 
cloud computing and related big data industries. In 2016, Guiyang hosted the inaugural 
Global Big Data Summit and Expo and the Eco-Civilization Forum Global Annual 
Conference in quick succession. As of 2015, Guiyang ranks 20th out of all provincial 
capitals in terms of GDP but 1st in terms of GDP growth, at a stunning 12.5%.  
By comparison, Guiyang’s advancement in social policy is less than stellar. 
According to an index developed by the Marco Polo Project to assess the difficulty in 
obtaining city hukou, Guiyang is actually one of the less accessible interior cities in 
terms of hukou. Guiyang was well known at the turn of the century as the pilot city for 
its comprehensive implementation of the nation-wide housing monetarization policy. 
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The headlong rush into full marketization for the sake of economic development 
objectives rather than actual housing needs led to soaring prices and severe inequality 
(Zhu and Lee, 2006). To this day, migrants are completely excluded from welfare 
housing. Nevertheless, not all policy areas are without progress. According to a 2017 
government report, enrollment in urban pensions and unemployment insurance saw a 
10% increase from the previous year. Enrollment in urban health insurance increased 
by about 5%. Almost all rural hukou holders are now covered by rural health insurance. 
88,000 people are beneficiaries of minimum social security benefits, although the 
number of people below the poverty line is unknown. According to the department of 
education, the percentage of migrant children enrolled in public schools has increased 
from 50% in 2010 to 68% in 2016.  
My interviewees in Guiyang are mostly married and aged between 20 and 40. 
While each individual and household had unique struggles, there were some common 
elements to their stories. First, none had intention to leave Guiyang in the near future, 
least of all return to their rural origins. Going to other cities involved too much 
uncertainty for children, and life in the village was not financially sustainable. Many 
lost their land to reforestation projects. They would also not subject any family member 
to the harsh living conditions back home. Second, education level was low and reflected 
a clear gender imbalance. Men typically completed five years of schooling (the number 
of elementary school years at the time of enrollment), and women typically between 
zero and three. Interviewees cited lack of skills and resources as the main reason for not 
migrating farther away or out of the province. There were no other large cities in 
Guizhou to migrate to. Some families were extended ones with adult siblings or elderly 
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parents living together. They typically relied on each other and close friends rather than 
the government. Housing contract was common, employment contract less so, and none 
was covered by urban social security. The jobs they took up in the city included carrying 
things – usually construction materials but could be anything, cleaning (domestic or 
public sanitation), operating small businesses, and working for companies in relatively 
low-skilled occupations. In summary, dire poverty in rural Guizhou drove out entire 
families; their limited education restricted the possible destinations to Guiyang, which 
had plenty of low-cost housing and low-skilled jobs; they seemed to be neither helped 
nor hindered by the state in achieving settlement.  
  The story of interviewee #GY-19 is illustrative. She worked the night shift as a 
janitor, so I talked to her during the day in her apartment, which she kept exceptionally 
clean and tidy, when her daughters came home from school for lunch. It was on the 
second floor of a shanty building in the dilapidated urban village of Meiyaozhai, which 
was why I was surprised to find that it had a full bathroom with running water and a 
kitchen with gas stoves (and that both were spotless).   
Now in her 30s, she had come from the rural areas of Anshun to Guiyang over 
ten years ago. She was married to a “naturalized” Guiyang citizen but later divorced 
him due to his drinking problems. Their two daughters were both born in Guiyang. 
Before she could register them as local residents, however, she got into some serious 
conflicts with her in-laws. Her daughters ended up being registered under Anshun 
agricultural hukou, the same as her, which prevented them from attending public schools 
in Guiyang. After the divorce, she tried to petition for changing her daughters’ hukou 
status to that of their birth father but could not produce marriage or divorce certificates 
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(which was not unusual for migrants). The children’s father not only refused to take a 
paternity test but kept missing court dates. After a long legal battle, she finally tracked 
him down and got him to sign a birth certificate, which the children did not have before 
due to the missing marriage certification. While the hukou application was still up in 
the air at the time of the interview, she at least obtained proof that her children were 
born in Guiyang.  
 She said she would do whatever it took to get her daughters educated, so that 
they would not grow up like her, not knowing even how to write their own names. She 
had never gone to school. Her parents allowed her two brothers to attend school and 
kept her and her sister at home due to gender discrimination. Now she took care of their 
elderly mother after their father passed away. Her older brother was working far away 
and never bothered to come home, and her younger brother never did much of anything 
at home. She had wanted to go farther too, but then there would be no one left to care 
for their mother. She had said to her mother: “you favored sons and despised daughters, 
and now your daughters are the only ones that can be relied on to look after you in 
sickness.” Not wanting her daughters to repeat her life, she was committed to further 
their education as much as possible, and had no plans to move unless for schooling 
reasons. 
 A much worse situation was that of interviewee #GY-27, who was living in a 
small space with no floors, walls, or furniture beneath a deafening train overpass. Like 
#GY-19, he was from rural Anshun, had lived in Guiyang for over ten years, and had 
both of his children in Guiyang. His wife first left, many years ago. His fifteen-year-old 
son also ran away from home and, at the time of the interview, had been gone for over 
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a year without contact; the eight-year-old daughter lived at school under the principal’s 
charity. He was seriously ill with abscesses but could afford no healthcare and had no 
access to rural medical insurance and minimum security that was supposedly very 
widespread in China. There was no more land for him to farm back home. He was the 
only male interviewee who had never gone to school; growing up, he had little food and 
clothing. There were no options for him besides stay where he was and continue to pick 
up trash for a living.   
 Constraints notwithstanding, several interviewees also said that they preferred 
living in Guiyang to anywhere else not only for the ease of cultural navigation but also 
for its mild climate and natural beauty. This suggests that urban amenities factor into 
consideration for some people. The construction of the first subway line in 2018 was 
another welcome improvement in public transportation, and there will be many more 
lines to come. On the other hand, urban redevelopment is rapidly driving up housing 
prices, which could make things difficult for aspiring homeowners. 
 
Anshun and Surrounding Areas 
Anshun is a small prefecture about one-hour-drive away from Guiyang most known for 
its heritage sites and natural amenities. According to the newest data from the Ministry 
of Ecology and Environment, Anshun has the best air quality among all cities in China. 
Geographically, it contains a small urban core of two urban districts with about half a 
million people and a vast expanse of counties, towns, townships, and villages with 1.8 
million, which add up to a total population of 2.3 million for the entire prefecture. 
Slightly over a million people live in the greater metropolitan area – districts plus 
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surrounding counties and towns, making Anshun about 44% urbanized. Since only 
about half a million (15% of the entire population) has urban hukou, most people living 
in urban areas are rural migrants. In 2014, it was among the first batch of pilot cities for 
new urbanization to serve as an example for other mountain cities. First, urban residents 
were reclassified according to whether they are incorporated in urban basic 
infrastructure and services. Second, small towns and villages were heavily targeted so 
that growth in the urban core can be spread and diffused. The city aims to transfer more 
rural people into non-agricultural occupations in industrial parks, agritourist villages, 
and boarding trade schools. In fact, the only two towns designated as national 
“characteristic towns” (those identified as having one or more robust industries) in 
Guizhou are found in Anshun. In the current development policy, there are two main 
points of emphasis: one is on the interconnectivities among the targeted towns and 
villages in the Guian New Area so that they all prosper together; the other is the 
necessity of moving people out of the isolated locations in mountains into more 
accessible places. 
 For the past decade or so, Anshun has been going through a construction boom 
aided by a double-digit annual GDP growth, which attracted many rural migrants from 
both within and outside the province. In fact, Anshun has a much higher proportion of 
interprovincial migrants (about 1 in 3) than Guiyang (about 1 in 5). I interviewed five 
labor contractors who were themselves rural migrants and worked extensively with 
migrants. Three of them had completed five years of schooling, started from manual 
labor, transitioned into the construction and renovation sector, and moved up the ranks. 
Two of them had gained industry experience in more developed provinces before 
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relocating to Anshun to take advantage of the opportunities in a rapidly growing but yet 
uncompetitive city; one is from Zhejiang originally and had completed nine years of 
compulsory education, and the other from a rural county in Guizhou and had gone to 
college. All were males in their 30s and 40s, married with children, and local 
homeowners.  
They talked to me about their own migration journeys as well as experiences 
recruiting and working with other migrant laborers. One of the recurring themes in our 
conversations was the difference between local and interprovincial workers. The latter 
was much more preferred by employers because they typically had more skill and 
education, showed greater commitment, and had better work ethic. The general 
comment by all interviewees was: “Local workers are lazy and laid back. Every other 
day, they would take a day off to attend some family or social event in their village or 
if someone in their family got sick. This makes them very unreliable. By contrast, 
workers from other provinces are far away from home and not distracted by these things. 
The only good thing about local workers is that you do not have to supply housing for 
those who live within commutable distances.” (multiple interviews: July 2017). 
Additionally, the experiences of interviewees #AS-01 and #AS-03, who had worked 
construction projects in eastern cities, had their own trans-provincial networks of 
laborers that they brought to Anshun. They themselves had always followed their bosses 
to wherever projects were. As a result, they also preferred workers that had stuck with 
them in the past to local workers in Anshun. A small percentage of the interprovincial 
workers brought their families with them and enrolled their children in peri-urban rural 
 90 
schools, which, based on my interviews with school administrators, was adding to the 
stress on public school facilities.  
Elsewhere in the greater Anshun, there is a scattered pattern of urbanization 
along main highway connecting Anshun and Guiyang, which emerged with the creation 
of Guian New Area in 2013. Toward the Guiyang end, “The Big Three” of ICT – China 
Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecommunications Corporation – have constructed 
offices, apartments, and warehouses for servers in a designated zone for big data and 
cloud computing. Toward the Anshun end, there is a string of agritourist villages with 
farms and restaurants, ecological parks that experiment with new methods of farming, 
tiny towns modeled after foreign countries with high-end shops, offices for 
technological start-ups and e-commerce platforms for local agricultural products, and 
the more traditional small-town industrial zones and farming villages that were there 
before. In 2016, the village of Tangyue in Pingba district of Anshun achieved national 
fame for eliminating poverty with minimal outside assistance and provoked intense 
debates about whether the model could be exported. Nowadays it is run more like a 
corporation with extremely strict rules for controlling the behaviors of local leaders. The 
village also has its own construction and transport companies. 
These projects of local urbanization have, for better or worse, brought real 
changes to local people’s livelihoods and attracted a few outsiders. Occupational 
transitions change migration patterns and family arrangements to some degree. For 
example, according to my interview with a village leader and representative in National 
People’s Congress, people in her village are having fewer children because they no 
longer feel as pressed to produce sons, since girls and young women can now get non-
 91 
agricultural jobs like receptionist or server in nearby tourist establishments that pay ten 
times more than farming (Interview #PB-09: July 9th, 2017). Some people gained new 
knowledge in business operations after transitioning into the tourism industry. In 
addition to job creation, the government is also investing in school infrastructure in these 
locations, expanding campuses and adding dormitories, which are free of charge for 
students living a distance away. I encountered a group of parents waiting outside one 
such school for their children to finish taking the entrance exams. If they pass, the 
parents plan on moving out of their home villages to try to find work in factories near 
the school or else commuting (Interview #PB-06).    
 For the most part, however, places in more peripheral parts of the new area 
barely felt anything at all. In a village at the very edge, about half of the young people 
had gone out to work, and this has not changed because of the new area. The entire 
village was resettled about ten years ago from deeper in the mountains to its current 
location which could be reached by motor vehicles via a dirt road. Two extended 
families that I interviewed with multiple adult members working or having worked in 
the eastern provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian had remarkably similar narratives. The 
women in both families never went to school, but they had relatives in the city, and they 
went there with their husbands who did for at least six years. Their decision to return 
had nothing to do with what was going on elsewhere in the county/district; they came 
back because they had earned enough money to build a house back home (government 
subsidy for relocation was not close to cover the cost). Having lost most of their 
farmland to reforestation, one of the families (#interview PB-16) was living on savings 
and meager earnings from selling ginger, not even taking advantage of a 50,000 yuan 
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of poverty assistance from the government because of the many strings attached, while 
the other (#PB-17) started a home business that was not particularly lucrative. Both had 
future plans to find better employment without going far from home for the sake of their 
children but acknowledged that factory work nearby was scarce and competitive. 
#Interviewee PB-16 thought that going all the way to Guiyang just to do menial labor 
would not be much of an improvement on their current situation in the village. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
“[P]eople are not migrating simply for their own benefit, but rather as part of a 
larger strategy for supporting and caring for their children, parents, spouses and 
extended kin, and for planning for their future family life.” (Kilkey et al., 2018; 
Baldassar et al., 2018).  
 
It is not possible to draw any kind of broad conclusions from a handful of narratives or 
generalize Guizhou’s situation to other western provinces – and certainly not the rest of 
the country. These stories revealed the urbanization process through ordinary people’s 
perceptions and lived experiences. They demonstrated how inequality within and 
beyond the province is carried over in the process of rural-urban migration and 
replicated/reproduced in the city At the household level, however, many experiences 
are comparable across different contexts – place-specific structural factors reduced to 
their individual components as defined by their impact on individuals and families. 
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Guizhou province is very much like a small developing country that has 
historically supplied raw materials and low-cost workers to advanced regions and 
recently received massive external aid to develop some of the more promising peripheral 
regions, while its primate city continues to bear the brunt of the migration pressures 
from displaced people from the most impoverished areas. While hope for future 
prosperity resonates in the policy documents, migrants experience real struggles and 
persist everyday despite lack of healthcare, poor housing conditions, and sometimes 
mountains of debts from failed business endeavors. 
Those who came out of the toughest areas recounted childhood memories of 
trudging for hours along hazardous mountain trails to the nearest school, carrying a 
small saucepan, a handful of raw rice, some yellow beans, chili peppers, and a chunk of 
lard – provisions that were supposed to last a week. After a short time, girls usually gave 
up, then a few more years later, boys as well. As teens, they came to Guiyang to find 
work, started families, and have lived there ever since. As frustrating as some were 
about not being able to enroll children in public schools, the alternative of subjecting 
them to the same ordeal as they had experienced was unthinkable.  
For them, Guiyang is home. Without sufficient money, information, education, 
skill, and connections, it would be a great struggle and risk to seek jobs in small towns 
or venture beyond the provincial border. These migrants have strong intention to settle 
down in Guiyang not so much because they are well-established or incorporated but 
because they have few other options. Besides a couple of empirical studies showing the 
negative correlation between urban settlement and the acreage of rural landholdings as 
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an indicator of rural ties (e.g. Tao et al., 2015), this dynamic is rarely acknowledged in 
case studies of mega-cities (e.g. Fan, 2011). 
Much of the provincial and local leaders’ energy is dedicated to wrestling with 
poverty and underdevelopment. The hasty implementation of the household 
responsibility system in the 1980s caused agricultural devastation. Now, many 
farmlands have been reclaimed for reforestation. This has cut off what few resources 
migrants have in their home villages. If developmental efforts have not had effect, it 
certainly is not the lack of trying. Everywhere in the populated parts of the province is 
a flurry of developmental activities. What used to be a bald hill with a few farmhouses 
surrounded by stretches of crops and grasses is now a bustling central business district 
with high-rises and shopping malls. While I was in the field, there was, in one county, 
a construction project of such immense scale that all traffic through it had to be rerouted 
to go around. However, the actions quickly taper off the farther one gets from major 
urban areas, until no sign of development remains but red banners that read: “latecomer 
advantage shall propel us to the front!”. Because diffused development is costly, 
resources can only be concentrated on a few choice spots. The idea is for these to 
become nodes from which growth will spread out, but as of now – six years into these 
projects, places as close as thirty-minute drive away remain largely unaffected. 
Moreover, economic development projects like data centers are especially poor at 
creating new local jobs. 
As of 2019, the provincial government has completed the bulk of the gargantuan 
task of relocating 1.88 million people out of the unforgiving depths of mountains into 
more hospitable areas, where they will receive new apartment housing, sufficient 
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income, and job training. It is not yet known if and how this will affect outgoing migrant 
members of these relocated families. So far, despite the visible progress in both urban 
and rural areas of the province, many city migrants find themselves in a gap that is not 
being adequately addressed in policy. New opportunities that have been created appear 
to be seized by only those who have the skills and resources to be mobile and those who 
were there before.  
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CHAPTER 5 
MIGRANT CHILDREN 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter focuses on the exclusion of migrant children from public education in 
Guiyang. The previous chapter showed that the informal settlements in the city are filled 
with migrants in a precarious situation. Many of those without documentation of 
residence or social security payments are barred from sending their children to public 
schools. Yet according to a recent study, cities in Guizhou are the friendliest to migrant 
children in the China (Chan and Ren, 2018) – a conclusion based on tabulating the ratio 
of migrant children versus left-behind children generated by policy exclusions. At the 
same time, in Guiyang, about one-third of migrant children have no access to public 
schools – about 12 percentage point higher than the national average. Clearly, in this 
case, “friendliness” does not translate to more inclusiveness, but rather greater tolerance 
and acceptance for low-cost private schools that cater to migrants.  
 Such “informal” schools are an increasingly common phenomenon in 
developing countries under the global trend of privatization and state retreat from 
welfare and service provision. They mostly serve children of low-income households 
living in deprived neighborhoods such as slums and peripheral settlements 
(Archambault, 2012; Harma, 2019). In China, low-cost private schools are also 
commonly known as migrant schools, and the terminology reflects exclusion based 
solely on designated “outsider” status. Two questions dominate the discussion in 
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research and policy regarding these schools – whether they should be allowed at all as 
a reasonable substitute for state schools, and if so, how they should be regulated by the 
government to ensure adequate quality. Previous studies have focused on either 
educational outcomes or regulatory aspects, both revealing the inferiority of these 
schools and suggesting they may be more of a problem than a solution. I take a more 
humanistic approach by focusing on what goes on inside the schools and incorporating 
the views of principals, teachers, parents, and students, and in so doing uncover 
previously overlooked aspects of what these schools do for migrant families that public 
schools cannot in terms of community-building and urban adaptation.   
 Guiyang is by no means the only city in China that relies on migrant schools. 
Beijing at one point had more than 300 such schools, except most of these were not 
legal. To make matters worse, the government has since the early 2000s gone on 
aggressive campaigns to eliminate them. Guangzhou has all but formalized these 
schools in name with the amount of aid and regulation from the government and 
accepted them as alternatives to public schools. Generally speaking migrant schools are 
still more need-based than choice-based and a last resort. Governments typically lack 
the capacity to supervise and support them but also depend on them to fill the gap left 
by the under-funded, over-burdened public school system. In Guiyang’s case, migrant 
schools are sustained by tuitions, meager and unpredictable government subsidies, and 
principals’ personal savings. As most of migrants come from within the province, which 
contains large swaths of destitute rural areas, many of them cannot pay full tuition. 
Migrant schools in Guiyang almost exclusively serve this population since migrants 
from wealthier places are either able to find a way to gain entry to city public schools 
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or have the option to leave their children in decent rural schools. The consequence is 
that migrant schools cannot always fulfill their mission to provide adequate education.  
 In Guiyang, as is the case for other cities, there are no provisions specifically 
prohibiting migrant students from entering public schools. Admission is based on a 
priority list. Local students are guaranteed admission. Non-local students are required 
to provide as many of the following documents they can: residence permit, proof of 
address, social insurance payment for three years, labor contract/pay stub/business 
license for three years, and proof of non-violation of birth control policy. These are not 
weighed equally; for instance, housing purchase counts for the most. Having all of the 
documents does not guarantee admission, nor does having none preclude the possibility 
of admission. It depends on the spots available in the school and principals’ discretion. 
Because the quality and reputation of schools varies widely and matter greatly, rent-
seeking behaviors among principals are common. Altogether, new arrivals, transients, 
migrants without formal residence or employment, migrants from poor rural areas that 
rely on the security provided by a large number of children, and migrants without 
financial resources – people who are already disadvantaged – typically get the short end 
of the stick as far as schooling is concerned. 
 The dilemma is that while these schools are obviously problematic, their 
existence is what enables migrant families to settle down with their children and makes 
the city migrant-friendly. On the other hand, the state’s tolerance for them can also serve 
to continue or even legitimate exclusionary practices without addressing the core issues. 
Sehgal (2005) cautions the celebration of self-help and community-based efforts as this 
can easily become justification for state retreat in providing for the social reproduction 
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of migrant workers. This chapter contends that these self-help efforts are better tailored 
to the needs of migrant families, although there are clear limits. Even if it were possible 
to remove migrant schools and move their students to public schools, migrant students 
have special needs that require dedicated attention.  
 
Research on Informal Schooling 
The existence of low-cost private schools is commonly attributed to the inability or 
unwillingness of governments in developing countries to provide public education to 
marginalized populations. Between the consideration of education as a universal human 
right (World Bank, 2018) and the inescapable reality of the lack of governmental 
capacity in low-income countries, questions are raised about whether low-cost private 
education can or should be a substitute and a complement to free public education, or 
whether the limited funds should be concentrated on the public or private sector, from 
both normative or outcome-oriented perspectives. As with other public services, a 
debate is emerging regarding schools about the benefits and harms of private providers 
– a counter-measure to state failures but highly vulnerable to market failures, with 
divergent conclusions about state involvement and policy implications for best forms of 
governance.  
Studies from international contexts are consistent in their reports on the inferior 
physical environment of private schools, but differ in their assessments of disparity in 
outcomes. Other studies focus on regulatory problems. Baum et al. (2018) showed that 
while state regulation of low-fee private education is absolutely necessary for quality 
assurance, tightening the restrictions for market entry for these schools facilitates the 
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proliferation of the unofficial market, which the state has little control over the 
questionable practices. They recommend that instead of regulating the input of private 
schools such as teachers, resources, and facilities (which encourage substandard schools 
to go underground), governments should pay more attention to the outcomes or results 
of education and regulate accordingly. Looking at cases in Kenya, Edwards et al. (2017) 
argued that private schools do not function in practice as in theory, and there is no way 
to regulate them that can fully eliminate the negative externalities, implying that 
education should be entirely within the domain of the state. Harma (2019) offers a 
pessimistic account of state regulatory failures based on stakeholder narratives and 
suggests that the only way forward that is not wholesale condemnation of private 
schools (which likely causes the most harm to low-income students) is supporting 
spontaneous local efforts arisen out of the drive of people to get a better education. By 
contrast, Heyneman and Stern (2014) are optimistic about the ability of private schools 
to deliver by observing that some families actually choose private schools when 
presented with public alternatives. Focusing similarly on public choice, Oketch et al. 
(2010) argued that free primary education policy in Sub-Saharan Africa is not serving 
the needs of the poor, leading to the mushrooming of the private school market to fulfill 
consumer demand.  
China’s case is yet different, as licensed migrant schools must be non-profit, 
though actual practices vary. Unregulated schools can be a mixed bag of legitimate 
education providers and profiteering enterprises. The relationship between the local 
government and migrant schools vary among cities. Writing on cases in Beijing, where 
the government is notoriously unsympathetic to migrant children, Kwong (2004) 
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documents a number of strategies employed by migrant schools to stay afloat, including 
accommodation, avoidance, and resistance: “The migrant children schools are not 
collectively organized; the proprietors act on their own. Many schools have gone under, 
but those who continue operating have adopted ingenious proactive and reactive steps 
to procure support from both the government and civil society” (p. 1086). Goodburn 
(2009) attributes hostility to migrant children and migrant schools in Beijing to a shared 
perception of migrants by the state and urban locals as uncultured people who take up 
valuable city resources.  
Schooling outcomes for migrants have broad societal consequences. The 
dualistic citizenship construct has created a large urban-rural disjuncture and likens 
internal migration in China to international migration. No summary, however detailed, 
could do justice to the voluminous valuable findings on segregation and assimilation 
from immigration studies. Suffice for the purpose of this chapter to mention a few key 
points. A host of individual, household, community, and larger structural factors affect 
assimilation outcomes; for children, experiences in schools have a decisive impact 
(Portes and Zhou, 1993). Schooling segregation by both race and socioeconomic status 
has been shown to produce negative outcomes for the affected students (Rumberger et 
al., 2005; Logan et al., 2012). School contexts matter greatly, particularly for 
disadvantaged students with fewer family resources, and these include curriculum, 
quality, social relationships, and student body composition (Hao and Pong, 2008; 
Hamnett et al. 2007). 
Studies in China have consistently shown poor educational outcomes for 
migrant schools compared to either urban or rural public schools (Chen and Feng, 2013; 
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Lai et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2017). However, there is little consensus on whether 
migrant schools overall “do more harm than good” in terms of expanding opportunities 
for migrant children and families, and hence no policy verdict on whether they should 
be shut down or receive increased support. In the absence of guaranteed access to public 
schools, they are indispensable for enabling migration and settlement as a family in the 
first place. Access to education and child supervision is one of the major practical 
considerations behind the decision to bring children to the city (Fan, 2011). Couples 
whose children are left behind in the village are unlikely to settle down in the city (Fan 
et al., 2011). Emotional attachment is also a factor in choosing to keep children close 
by – having family or children in the destination city is a form of sociocultural 
attachment that has been argued to contribute positively to settlement intention (Chen 
and Liu, 2016; Du and Li, 2012).  
The availability of migrant schools means fewer left-behind children, who tend 
to grow up to be very disadvantaged in the labor market (Lyu and Chen, 2018; Wei, 
2018). The decision to permanently settle as a family allows children to adapt to city 
life. Yuan et al. (2013) showed that migrant school students psychologically adapt to 
living in the cities just as well as migrant students in public schools. However, they also 
found that migrant schools are not conducive to sociocultural adaption; in fact, their 
students grow closer to their origin culture and more distant from their host culture over 
time (Yuan et al., 2013). Lu and Zhou (2011) found poorer achievement and more 
loneliness for migrant school students than for migrant students in public schools, and 
little to no difference between urban locals and migrants in public schools. These 
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findings suggest that schooling segregation, and perhaps even migrant schools 
themselves, needs to be placed under greater scrutiny. 
The role of migrant schools as the sole cause of educational disparity and other 
disconcerting outcomes, however, has also been questioned. Liu et al. (2015), despite 
confirming that students in migrant schools do worse in mathematics than migrant 
students in public schools, show that the parents’ socioeconomic status play an even 
more prominent role in determining student performance. In a similar vein, Qian and 
Walker (2015) found that significant inequalities persist despite the government’s 
investment in broadening educational opportunities for migrant students, indicating that 
other factors are at work in producing educational disparities. Wu (2010) showed that 
the effect of family background on educational attainment remains undiminished in the 
course of remarkable expansion in educational opportunities. These findings cast doubt 
on the seemingly obvious conclusion that institutional exclusion is at the root of poor 
integration outcomes. With that said, however, although removing school segregation 
would not solve the problem of educational inequality, it should be the first step. 
 
Fieldwork 
40 semi-structured interviews ranging from 20 minutes to 2.5 hours were conducted at 
or near seven schools with varying characteristics in Guiyang (Table 1) with respect to 
size, location, student body composition, and type. No two schools were located in the 
same neighborhood. As all interviews were conducted on-site, I was able to take notes 
and photographs on the physical conditions of the schools and the neighborhoods. Even 
though the public schools are larger than private schools in terms of student body size, 
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there is no a priori reason to expect that this would affect the analysis. Migrant schools 
in general are a lot smaller because lack of resources limits how much they can be scaled 
up as business operations.   
 
Table 5.1 – List of schools interviewed 
 
Type Location Grade % Migrant Size 
SCHOOL A Private Peripheral 
chengzhongcun* 
K-9 100% 
Migrant 
450 Students 
SCHOOL B** Private Central chengzhongcun K-6 100% 
Migrant 
320 Students 
SCHOOL C Private Central chengzhongcun K-6 100% 
Migrant 
150 Students 
SCHOOL D Private Peripheral 
chengzhongcun 
K-6 100% 
Migrant 
120 Students 
SCHOOL E Public Urban CBD 7-12 30% Migrant 3000 Students  
SCHOOL F Public Urban CBD 1-6 < 5% 
Migrant 
1600 Students  
SCHOOL G Public Urban residential 1-6 60% Migrant 1000 Students  
* chengzhongcun is the Chinese term for “village-in-the-city” – former rural villages engulfed 
by urban expansions 
**School B was the only one that did not have a license. 
 
 
The majority of the data collection was done in the four migrant schools in the city – 
code-named School A, B, C, and D. The principals and the teachers were the first to be 
interviewed in their offices. The questionnaire for principals consisted of questions 
about personal background, details of school operation, relationships with students, 
parents and teachers, as well as interactions with government departments. The teachers 
were asked mostly about their working conditions and personal interactions with student 
families. The migrant parents were either chosen randomly at school or introduced by 
the principals and teachers, and the interviews were conducted either at schools or in 
their homes. The questionnaires for parents were the most comprehensive and include 
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inquiries on personal background, work, family structure, migration history, housing, 
and children’s education (including attempts to enroll children in public schools, 
attitude toward migrant schools, and opinions about exclusion and social rights). Some 
interviews were conducted in a group setting.   
The three public schools with varying proportion of migrant students (which is 
inversely related to their reputation) were included for comparison. In addition to similar 
background questions, the principals were asked about how migrant children were 
accepted or rejected, and on what grounds. The teachers were asked about specific 
challenges they encountered when working with migrant students in their classes. 
School F, with just a handful of migrant students, is the most prestigious elementary 
school in the city. On the other hand, School E and G, with 1/3 and 2/3 of its student 
body composed of migrant students, respectively, are ranked relatively low among city 
schools.   
Additional interviews were conducted with five local experts serving in different 
capacities: A provincial-level policymaker, a city-level official in the department of 
education who was also a retired high school principal, a director of a non-profit 
organization that worked with thousands of migrant students in the city to promote 
integration at the school level, a professor at a local university who has been researching 
migrant children’s education in Guiyang for over a decade, and an education consultant 
with an extensive network of public and private school officials. Each person was 
interviewed twice – first in 2016 at the start of the fieldwork with a follow-up in 2017 
toward the end of fieldwork. These interviews were more open-ended and structured 
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around each person’s unique knowledge about the issue. Two of the experts also helped 
in facilitating communication in a few of the interview sessions. 
 
The Government 
In 2010, Guizhou’s seven major cities had on average 36.56% of migrant children 
enrolled in migrant schools. The provincial capital Guiyang alone had 48.58%, which 
suggests that the faster the growth of a city, the more likely that education resources 
such as funding, space, teachers, and facilities run thin (Xiao, 2012). Over the past few 
years, Guiyang has made significant improvement in expanding admission of migrant 
children in public schools (down to 36.89% of migrant children enrolled in migrant 
schools in 2014, 34.75% in 2015, and 31.77% in 2016, according to government 
reports), but this was accomplished at the cost of stretching class sizes well beyond 
limit. As of 2016, there are approximately 170,000 migrant children in the city.   
A 2013 policy document outlined more rigorous screening and licensing 
requirements for new private schools. While the government aims to raise the quality of 
private education for new institutions, existing migrant schools are allowed to continue 
as before. This is confirmed by the interviews with government officials: “The 
Guiyang government is supportive of private schools, even the low-end ones, and this 
support is actually growing, just that the funding isn’t always guaranteed due to flaws 
in the implementation. Even though those below-standard migrant schools will 
eventually be phased out and eliminated, the government is still giving them money (at 
least 300-400 yuan per student) just to keep the schools open and their teachers paid for 
now. This is how desperately the government depends on them.” (Interview 21 June 
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2017) However, based on interviews with principals, this small amount of money does 
not always reach the schools. 
The government’s two-pronged strategy of expanding public schools and 
phasing out low-end migrant schools is running into numerous practical difficulties. In 
addition to fiscal limitations, the city’s mountainous geography restricts the amount of 
available land and the choice of location for new construction. Building new schools 
would also have been easier if the migrants were concentrated on urban peripheries as 
is the case for many cities, but Guiyang’s migrant settlements are too scattered for land 
to be allocated efficiently (Interview 8 July 2016). One way is to expand existing 
schools near migrant settlements, but extra land is difficult to come by in the middle of 
the city. Hence the importance of migrant schools is unlikely to diminish in the coming 
years with continued in-migration. 
 
The Schools 
The main explanations for the inferior quality of informal schools in general boil down 
to a lack of funding and regulation. The conditions of migrant schools in Guiyang are 
particularly abysmal as a result of the small amount of financial support that the 
government is able to provide and the poor financial situations of intraprovincial 
migrant families. The many problems of the schools apparent to observers, however, 
belie the special functions and resources they provide for student families. Without 
romanticizing, migrant schools offer a degree of flexibility in terms of school hours, 
tuition payments, and community engagement that would be unthinkable for public 
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schools; teachers are attentive to student needs; principals and proprietors are resilient 
and adamant in their resolution to keep their schools open.  
Relatively unburdened by rules and regulations, migrant school operations are 
often shaped by negotiations between the principals and parents. The flexibility in 
school hours suits migrants, who typically work long hours or far from home. All four 
migrant schools had at least one person – a teacher or a cook – who supervised children 
after school and even overnight, despite significant legal risks. As a result, some parents 
falsify the age of their four-year-old in order to get them enrolled just so they will be 
cared for.  
Another aspect of flexibility is displayed in the principals’ tolerance for delayed 
tuition payments. Migrant schools in Guiyang typically charge 600-800 yuan for per-
semester tuition. This is affordable for most steadily working households, but some 
experience difficulties due to precarious employment situations or a large number of 
children. About 30 to 40 out of 120 students at School D owed school tuition. The 
principal knew that a few families had absolutely no money to spare now or in the near 
future, and he did not expect them to ever repay the debt, but he could not bear the 
thought of expelling the students. The only bargain he held against these families was 
refusing to admit additional siblings. Teachers made frequent home visits not just to 
check up on students’ well-being, but also to convince the parents to pay as early as 
possible, negotiate a schedule, and secure verbal confirmation. Frequent personal 
interactions such as these also help establish familiarity and support community-
building. The interactions between the teachers and students are closer and more 
personal. The teachers reported that they sometimes bought meals for students if there 
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was no one to cook for them and walked them home on rainy days to make sure they 
got there safely.  
Even parents who were actively trying to transfer their children to a public 
school in fact had few complaints about their current school. Their frustration was with 
being excluded and rejected from public schools, not with migrant schools themselves. 
One mother said that while she had all the documents required to enroll her daughter in 
a public school, she was dismayed by the rude treatment from the teachers. In the end, 
she chose to transfer her daughter to School B, an unlicensed migrant school, after 
seeing her six-year-old child in tears after her brief experience in the public school: “
Those teachers at that public school treat us like second-class. They look down on my 
daughter because she hadn’t learned as much as city kids. Here, [at School B], the 
teachers treat us with respect and listen to our opinions. They are genuinely concerned 
with my child’s well-being. Even though this school cannot compare with public 
schools in terms of physical conditions, my daughter is happy here. And if she can learn 
here, there is really no point in enrolling her in a public school.” (Interview 5 July 2016)  
The principals of migrant schools also viewed themselves as part of the migrant 
community, but with the knowledge and expertise in education to fulfill an important 
purpose and mission. They characterized their determination to run migrant schools as 
mostly altruistic and fought to keep their schools open despite significant financial 
losses and personal sacrifices. The principal of School D was over 70 years old. When 
asked why he decided to open a migrant school in retirement, he replied: “As an 
educator, seeing children running around, picking up trash for money, when they should 
be in school, but there are just no schools for them in this city. I found when I was 
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helping conduct a district-wide survey that about 3000 migrant kids were out of school 
and wandering in the streets. So, I convinced some of my friends to go in the business 
with me, and together we are able to solve some of their schooling problems.” (Interview 
10 July 2017) At the edge of the city where the majority of the migrants were illiterate 
and earned a living by picking up trash and cleaning riverbeds, he waived tuition for a 
third of his students. He also used to bring rice and oil frequently to some families but 
stopped when he discovered that the parents sold these to purchase alcohol. He sought 
out charities in the city to donate clothes and bookbags and offered beds and hot showers 
for eight students whose homes were unlivable. The boarders, supervised by an elderly 
woman, appeared well cared-for and content at the time of my visit.  
Finally, migrant schools are a space for civil society involvement and 
intervention targeted at migrant populations. In an interview, the director of the local 
NGO previously mentioned – one that works with migrant schools to provide extra 
teaching support – had tried to collaborate with public schools that had high percentages 
of migrant students to offer extracurricular programs. However, its attempts were futile 
because public schools had such strict regulations about class hours, use of facilities, 
and campus safety that any involvement of outside organizations was out of the 
question. School G has a special program for migrant students that involves volunteers, 
but it was fully sponsored by the government. For migrant schools, however, once the 
principals were convinced of the value and purpose of his projects, they had the freedom 
to offer programs such as afterschool tutoring, art and music lessons on Fridays, training 
classes for teachers, and counseling sessions for parents.  
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These aspects of migrant schools contribute to positive experiences for migrant 
families, and children’s happiness with their school discourages the parents from 
wanting to transfer their children. When asked about future plans to move, the parents 
replied along the lines of “waiting until the children finish school here first” (multiple 
interviews). In other words, migrant schools are the anchor around which other plans 
are made and a place for developing community ties and sense of belonging. 
 However, there are limitations to the extent that communities can function 
without the aid of the state. While government funding is promised to migrant schools, 
it is not always delivered. The principal of School C said that government funding made 
a negligible difference in her budgeting, while the principal of School D had not seen 
any funding for two years when his school was supposed to be entitled to an annual 300 
RMB per student. On top of that, with many student families unable to pay tuition, 
school principals have no choice but to cut costs at every opportunity including repairs, 
equipment, and staff salaries. The most visible inadequacy of migrant schools as a result 
of low funding is the depraved physical conditions. The migrant schools in this study 
shared the commonalities of dimly-lit, over-crowded classrooms and tiny outdoor 
spaces for exercise. For example, at school C, because the classes took place in 
irregularly oblong spaces, students in the back, many of whom appeared eager to 
participate, frequently complained that they could not hear the teachers over the constant 
ruckus in the front of the classroom. Classrooms were also missing modern technologies 
such as computers and projectors. Neighborhood conditions were also poor as public 
services such as waste management were lacking.  
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The impact of inadequate regulation is reflected in staffing and management. 
Qualified and certified teachers are in short supply even for the city’s public schools. 
Teachers in migrant schools interviewed in this study are either elderly retirees or young 
graduates transitioning to a better job. Young teachers are inexperienced and “flighty” 
– leaving the job as soon as something else becomes available, sometimes mid-semester. 
While public school teachers anywhere in the country are required to go through 
rigorous training and pass standardized examinations, migrant school principals hire 
anyone willing to accept low wages, no benefits, and a heavy workload (Friedman, 
2017). There are often no written contracts. The principal of School C made the teachers 
vouch for families using their own wages and withheld the teachers’ wages the students 
paid tuition, which is of course unfair to the teachers. Working under harsh conditions, 
some teachers act irresponsibly in matters relating to their students’ academic progress. 
For example, they give passing grades for failing performances to cover up any 
problems with learning and to avoid dealing with complaints from parents (Interview 6 
July 2017).  
Finally, while migrant schools are largely tolerated by the Guiyang government, 
they are still at constant risk of closure. School C and its neighborhood are fortunately 
protected from urban redevelopment by an old, difficult-to-move cemetery and 
crematorium. The principal at the time of the interview, however, was engaged in a 
battle with a neighboring landowner whose new unit construction was infringing on her 
already small school spaces. The local government refused to intervene on her behalf 
because she was only a renter. School B, after 11 years of operating legally, lost its 
license when it was rezoned into a different city district during city expansion. The new 
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district-level department of education has been ignoring the principal’s repeated 
applications for a new license for the past four years. To this day, the 320 students who 
attend the school do not receive official certification of study progress, which means 
that they cannot transfer to public school or advance to secondary schools. The principal 
of School D has relocated his school twice in the past ten years due to urban 
redevelopment – each time closer to the city periphery, in the process losing about two-
thirds of his students. Because he rented his school building from landowners in the 
urban villages, he only received meager compensation for the second relocation and 
none for the first. Running out of funds, he has remained determined to keep his school 
open for as long as possible with personal savings, income from retirement, and loans. 
This did mean that costs needed to be cut down. 
 
The Families 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, all of the parents interviewed at migrant schools 
reported between 0 to 5 years of schooling. Most of them migrated out of necessity 
because they could no longer subsist on farming and had to bring their children along 
to spare them the harsh life back home. Several extended families including the elderly 
and siblings have entirely uprooted from their villages and have no plans to return, so 
there would not have been anyone to care for left-behind children in any case. Their 
lands were underproductive and had been reclaimed by the provincial government for 
reforestation and ecological restoration. Even though these migrants are referred to as 
rural, in reality, they are no longer connected to their agricultural lifeline. This profile 
of migrant school attendees was also confirmed by other interviewees.  
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Low education attainment and high rates of illiteracy are common among these 
migrants and severely limit their employment and housing options. Not being able to 
produce the proper documents that show at least three years of employment and 
residence contract, a valid business license, and social security payments – in addition 
to violating the birth control policy – gives public school principals a valid reason for 
denying admission (according to interview with the principal of School E, 7 July 2016). 
These requirements are stringent for many migrants in Guiyang because they simply 
could not be met. Ostensibly, the requirements are about length of residence, and 
planning officials in China often justify their policies by making a distinction between 
temporary or floating populations and long-term residents. And yet, based on a poll 
conducted at School C, out of the 109 students from grade 3 to 6, 89 of them have lived 
in Guiyang for more than three years, 47 have for more than 7 years, and 23 were born 
in Guiyang, but their parents are not any closer now to accruing the required documents 
than when they first arrived.  
Many of the interviewed parents had repeatedly tried to enroll their children in 
public schools and failed; others never tried because they expected to fail; and still 
others had never bothered finding out about it because they thought the process was 
unfathomable and fraught with challenges. A parent interviewed at School B conveyed 
his frustration with the process: “I have three children, no siblings to help me, and two 
parents over 80 that need me. I spend a lot on housing but don’t have a housing contract, 
so I get turned away from public schools every time. A friend from my hometown killed 
himself last year because a public school wouldn’t admit his son because of bad grades 
– it was just an excuse to keep out migrants like us.” (Interview: 5 July 2016)  
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Several other interviewed parents also cited their children’s poor grades as a 
deterrent from making the attempt at gaining access to public schools, while school 
officials adamantly denied rejecting students on the basis of grades. What is certain is 
that principals of public schools wield considerable power over admission. The existing 
policy allows principals to deny migrants admission for fear of lowering school ranking 
or dealing with “problem” students. Teachers’ salaries are also affected by student test 
scores. In a few cases, even if a migrant is able to supply all the required paperwork for 
public schools, principals can still deny admission by filling the spots with local students 
who have better grades, parental connections, or can pay arbitrary fees (Interview 5 July 
2016). Such was the case in School F, where poor migrants had virtually no chance of 
being admitted even if they lived nearby. In times when crackdowns on such corruption 
are less severe, the spots within a school that should have been left for migrant students 
are frequently “bought up” by people with means (see endnote for more detailed 
explanation). Some of these people with means are migrants, but their situation is not 
commonplace, especially among rural migrants. 
Scholars have suggested that the effect of socioeconomic status of migrant 
families might outweigh the effects of exclusionary policies in causing educational 
disparities. This chapter finds that while between-group socioeconomic differences do 
cross the schooling barrier, but they also interact with segregation and exclusion to 
reinforce stratification in more ways than one. For starters, a student’s socioeconomic 
status affects his or her chances of gaining entry to public schools. Families with enough 
financial resources can overcome hukou restrictions by purchasing properties near good 
schools. Secondly, if schooling decisions are considered as choices instead of 
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constraints, one can make inferences about parental goals and expectations via their 
choice of schools. For instance, because of the poor quality of migrant schools and the 
fact that migrant students cannot take college entrance exams, parents who have high 
hopes for their children’s future would rather send them back to the village to be 
educated at rural public schools, which have improved in recent years, even if it means 
giving up their city jobs or splitting up the family. By contrast, parents who are content 
with sending their children to migrant schools without making any effort to get them 
out may not have as high expectations in terms of educational attainment.  
The lack of parental supervision is common among migrant families, but in most 
cases it is compelled by circumstances such as long working hours rather than willful 
neglect. Nevertheless, it is still a major complaint among teachers in both migrant and 
public schools. The extent of it might be greater for migrant schools, possibly because 
there are fewer rules mandating parental involvement. According to the principal of 
School C: “Most of the parents are out working all day and have barely any time to 
supervise their children. I still haven’t met or spoken to the parents of a few students 
who have been going here for several years. The children brought the tuition and 
registration forms themselves, and their parents stay completely off the grid… I’d say 
about 30% of the parents actually care about how their kids do in school.” (Interview 9 
June 2017) 
This roughly 1/3 of parents concerned with their children’s academic progress 
was also cited separately by the principals of Schools A and D. The permissiveness of 
migrant schools places more responsibility on individual parents to choose their level 
of involvement and attentiveness. In this way, a student’s academic progress is more 
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dependent on the parents’ personal attitudes, values, and beliefs about the importance 
of education. Some parents were actively involved and met with teachers frequently, 
while others did not seem at all appreciative of education’s importance, or they wished 
to be more involved but lacked the ability to read and understand their children’s 
homework assignments or communicate effectively with the teachers. They did not 
know to intervene when their children were falling behind, especially if the teachers did 
not press the issue, as was often the case. 
The teachers said that the lack of support at home, as well as the unreasonable 
expectation of some parents that the teachers were entirely responsible for their children, 
made their job more frustrating and drained their motivation. In public schools, migrant 
students were described as a particularly difficult group. Their levels of achievement 
varied: some students were independent self-starters, while others had low motivation. 
Even for the driven students, however, their parents are less likely than their urban 
counterparts to be able to afford after-school or extracurricular pursuits. Public schools 
offer many more free programs, which their migrant students may have access to. 
Migrant school students, by comparison, enjoy no such privilege; their exposure to 
cultural activities and sports is conditional on the sponsorship of private actors. Most 
migrant schools do not have such support from the civil society. The educators 
interviewed agreed that migrant students on average require more attention from the 
school to meet their unique educational and psychological needs, which currently both 
public schools and migrant schools provide (in different capacities) insufficiently. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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Insofar as they are able to operate without disruption, migrant schools are an anchor for 
social life and promote settlement, stability, and community-building. The children I 
interacted with expressed strong attachment to their schools, teachers, and classmates. 
There is little discrimination in migrant schools. Teachers have a closer relationship 
with their students through frequently visiting student homes to obtain tuition payment 
and having to take on extra supervision of children when their parents are at work. 
Principals are flexible about tuition payments. These schools have provided the 
opportunity for families to stay together in the city, but they evince a devil’s bargain: 
The poor educational quality could undermine the future success of migrant children. 
Both factors are related to the interior city’s economic and developmental 
circumstances. The government is able to allocate only limited financial support (which 
often fails to make it to the hands of principals) and tolerates lower standards. Students 
come some of the most destitute villages in the country, and the inability of many 
families to pay full tuition on time further restricts school funds. Even if the conditions 
of migrant schools were to improve in the future, the students attending them would still 
be socially and culturally segregated from their counterparts in public schools and urban 
locals.    
Migrant schools do not only serve urban transients who float from city to city, 
but also long-term (migrant) residents who have not been incorporated into the formal 
economy or formal housing market. The latter group of migrants is excluded from public 
education due to the inability to produce the necessary paperwork, violation of birth 
control policy, and/or lack of knowledge about navigating the process – all of which 
have little to do with their length of residence in the city. Therefore, the popular 
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justification for the exclusion of the floating population based on their ephemeral 
contribution to the city’s economy does not hold for this group of migrants. Their 
exclusion reflects the fundamental logic in China’s urban citizenship that dislocates 
institutional space (where migrants receive services) from the geographical space 
(where migrants live).  
From a policy standpoint, since migrant schools fulfill a critical demand in the 
urbanizing city, shutting them down in one sweep would not work. If nothing is done, 
they will continue to attract more families to a city that is already struggling to provide 
– leading to a pattern of persistent segregation. Migrant schools may have started out as 
a quick patch to the crisis of urbanization, but they have since evolved into an important 
co-producer of urban services for and alongside of the state. Policies concerning them 
need to be carefully considered – whether they should be regulated, formalized, or 
closed. Based on the findings in this study about some of the more nuanced roles that 
migrant schools fulfill, local policies should focus on supporting migrant schools or 
relevant non-profit organization at the same time as increasing capacity in public 
schools. At the provincial level, resource allocation mechanisms can stand to be 
improved to make sure that funding follows the migrant student from origin to 
destination as he or she moves to the city. Whether or not the private sector can 
successfully fill the gap, migrant children have special needs and face greater challenges 
in life, and should therefore not be ignored.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation research was motivated by profound changes in China’s rural-urban 
migration dynamics entering the twenty-first century and the deep impacts of policies 
that could determine the fate of future generations. Rarely do we get to observe how the 
urbanization of millions in a country with a transitioning economy and one-party state 
unfolds. As many have argued, so far the Chinese government has relied on a mostly 
unsustainable form of urbanization – one important aspect of which is the exclusion of 
rural migrants from equal opportunities in the city. Even formally-employed migrant 
workers in regulated industries are often denied various rights and services on the basis 
of their non-local hukou status. By interfering so heavy-handedly in the market, the state 
has in fact accommodated it by creating a large supply of low-cost and exploitable labor. 
The household registration system not only instigated massive inequalities on its own 
but also reinforced new ones that emerged from market processes.  
 Nevertheless, opportunities abound in a country where reforms are frequent and 
speedy. Not thirty years have passed since the creation of a private housing market 
accessible to virtually anyone with the financial means and a revamped social security 
system that now extends to rural residents and non-state employees. As cities grew, 
more doors opened. At the same time, we continue to see large segments of the migrant 
population living on the margins and working long hours for little money, constantly 
thwarted by all the hoops they must jump through to obtain the most basic services for 
themselves and their families. The central government, being reluctant to abolish the 
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hukou system, resorts to making incremental changes that have insignificant effect and 
leave loopholes for some of the more powerful local governments to exercise arbitrary 
exclusions. Improving the rights of rural migrants has always been on the table, but 
there has yet been any truly transformative action. The New Urbanization Plan, the first 
major policy document that explicitly addresses sustainable urban development, simply 
outlines ways to redirect migration flows instead of addressing the fundamental 
inequities in current system of urban management. Hukou restrictions are only lifted in 
places where they hardly matter, while the establishment of point-based systems in large 
cities divide migrants into tiers of welfare citizens based on their perceived “merits”.  
 The intention of this dissertation is to understand more about China’s recent 
urbanization experience at the household level and to identify individual and contextual 
factors that shape migration decisions and enable some to do better than others. The 
interplay of these factors is complicated. Traditional theoretical frameworks for rural-
urban migration such as the Harris-Todaro model predict that rising unemployment 
levels and living costs should be enough to “choke off” city growth (Harris-Todaro, 
1970; Fields, 1982; Brueckner and Zenou, 1999). Empirical observations showed that 
the story is not quite so simple. Economic considerations, while important, often do not 
constitute the entire basis for migration decisions. Influenced by sociological research 
on international immigration, there emerged a scholarly tradition to view internal 
migration as essentially the same process as immigration, only without the involvement 
of nation-state border patrol, rather than something fundamentally different. Research 
in urban studies on citizenship fragmentation and exclusionary growth echoes this 
scholarship. Consequently, theories of assimilation gained favor in the study of internal 
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migration, especially in countries like China where there exists formal institutions 
regulating local citizenship. Empirical studies on migration decisions began to cover a 
wider-ranging set of variables such as life-cycle factors, access to public services, non-
economic considerations for dependent family members such as children, and the 
impact of rural displacement due to developmental programs or climate change 
(Brueckner and Lall, 2015). Studies on migration outcomes also began to include more 
longer-horizon variables such as homeownership, settlement intention, integration, and 
intergenerational mobility or stratification.  
 Informed by this framework, I set out to look into what matters when migrants 
try to build a life in the city. Each empirical chapter presents a piece of the puzzle 
through its findings. Chapter 3, for example, shows that having social security, keeping 
the family together, and moving within the province are associated with higher 
likelihood of housing ownership, suggesting indirectly that interior cities might be more 
realistic option for nearby migrants to achieve upward residential mobility. At the same 
time, these cities also have weaker public services that may undermine integration. 
Chapter 4 shows that migrant families in the provincial capital of Guizhou are not going 
anywhere else even though life is very harsh. They brought their children along to spare 
them of the abysmal rural conditions and give them a better future in the city. Peripheral 
development in the surrounding areas benefit the locals to some extent but generates 
few jobs for laborers from elsewhere in the province. Improvement in transportation 
and communications technology makes it easier to look around for jobs, which could 
contribute to increased migration to cities that offer them. Chapter 5 illustrates how the 
openness of the provincial city toward migrant children comes at the expense of relying 
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on private schools. While these schools work for migrants in many ways and keep them 
anchored in the city, the educational outcomes suffer due to severe lack of funding. 
One major emphasis of this dissertation, as evident in the research design and 
analysis, is the geography of migration in China. A combination of geographical 
advantages and supportive policies propelled some cities to massive size as well as 
national and global prominence. These are concentrated along the east coast. Cities in 
the interior, having grown at a more moderate pace if at all, are typically much smaller. 
The movement of people from the less developed interior to the more advanced coast 
resulted from and further contributed to widening regional disparity. Furthermore, 
because internal migration is so critical to shaping city demographics, inequality at the 
regional level is manifested in inequality at the local level. The NUP is meant to address 
this. As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, its crux is entirely about the spatial redistribution 
of resources and people. The plan does not simply suggest speeding up urbanization to 
maintain economic growth, but it also proposes a more dispersed form of urbanization 
through the creation of city-region clusters throughout the country, development of 
small towns, and rural-to-urban hukou conversions in low-tier cities. By ordering large 
cities to maintain their hukou restrictions and control population growth, any 
prospective increase in official or unofficial urban population has to be absorbed 
elsewhere. The growth of secondary cities could even attract migrants from primary 
cities, thereby reducing the pressure there.  
 However, this projected “everybody wins” scenario is not exactly a 
transformative vision for greater egalitarianism. The total number of urban hukou-
holders means relatively little when one considers how widely hukou benefits vary from 
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place to place. For example, this number can be raised by nominal conversions for local 
rural residents without substantial improvements in accessing benefit. In other words, 
the NUP is suggesting that people be directed to places where the cost of public 
provisions is much lower, so that it would be possible for more rural migrants to become 
officially registered urban citizens. These people would have to accept lower qualities 
of urban amenities, public transportation, and schools, if they could find employment in 
the much smaller pool of jobs.   
 Yet the potential of average cities for lifting rural migrants out of poverty has 
been revisited again and again. A mounting pile of evidence showed that under 
favorable circumstances and effective policies, these cities offer a better alternative than 
toiling in the unforgivingly competitive environment of mega-cities. The lower cost-of-
living could contribute to increased savings which could go toward asset-building. 
Chapter 3 shows that homeownership among rural migrant households is much higher 
in central and western regions of China than the eastern region. This is most likely due 
to difference in affordability, but also to some extent whether migrants view the cities 
they live in as a stable home or “base of operation”. This means that living in interior 
cities is a more accessible option. Less can be said, however, about the level of welfare 
benefits or quality of public services. For example, descriptive data shows that social 
security coverage is the lowest in the western region, granted that the discrepancy 
between migrants and urban locals is smaller. If interior cities do indeed provide a more 
hospitable environment for permanent migrants, it could be even more harmful in the 
long run to leave the inadequacy of social provisions unaddressed.    
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The case study of Guizhou gives concrete examples of what this kind of more 
permanent migration looks like. Having been largely neglected in developmental efforts 
until recently, the province is dealing the consequences of its underdevelopment on all 
fronts. Spatially, it has one large primate city (the provincial seat), myriad small cities, 
and almost no medium-sized cities. Many rural areas hidden away in the mountains are 
among the harshest and most deprived places in the world. Because their agricultural 
values are so low, the government has reclaimed much of the farmland for reforestation 
and moved large numbers of people out of these villages and resettling them in vacant 
land that offer little employment. Both poverty and poverty reduction efforts such as 
these have the effect of driving people into cities. The provincial capital is particularly 
attractive because it is large enough to offer a variety of jobs for all skill levels and not 
so large as to be unaffordable. For many migrants that I encountered, migrating to 
Guiyang seemed like the only sensible option. Not only that, staying in the city is just 
as necessary as moving there in the first place. What little land they have back home is 
not enough to sustain them, and there is nothing else for them back home. The difficult 
conditions also motivate migrants to bring their children with them. Studies have shown 
that the longer children stay in the city, the less likely parents will move away. For 
migrants with minimum schooling, leaving the province entails competing with other 
job-seekers who likely have had more education or training, navigating a culturally 
unfamiliar terrain, and possibly paying more for necessities while there. 
 The strong settlement intention that I observed among the migrants in Guiyang 
appeared to have little to do with formal integration. Certainly, having a decent job and 
house add to the incentive to continue living in the city, but they are not essential. Those 
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living in poor conditions with informal, low-paying, and difficult jobs – and little hope 
on the horizon for a positive change – were just as determined to stay, for all the reasons 
above. This dynamic is not evident in quantitative studies on settlement intention, which 
typically only test factors that might indicate “legitimate” ties to the city, such as high 
income, secure housing, formal employment, and a robust social network that includes 
a great number of local acquaintances. By contrast, my interviews revealed that what 
these migrants need to survive in the city is the wide availability of informal work, 
housing, and education – none of which are likely to show up as significant determinants 
for settlement intention. This suggests a need to re-examine the connection between 
settlement and integration. From the research angle, longer duration of stay does not 
always lead to more access to citizenship benefits. From the policy angle, excluding 
migrants does not always deter long-term migration. It depends crucially on the context 
of the migration system – conditions in the rural areas, conditions in the cities, and the 
linkages between the origins and destinations. 
 More research is required to determine whether the case of Guizhou may be 
generalizable to other large prefectures and primate cities in underdeveloped provinces 
that attract mostly destitute or displaced intraprovincial migrants and have relatively 
little power and means to provide for them or turn them away. The retreat of state leaves 
more room for migrants to exercise their agency, and informal activities are likely to 
become difficult to control. This in turn could fuel more migration. Without state 
support and incorporation, some migrants are likely to be trapped in persistent poverty. 
Daily existence revolves around sustenance and survival rather than socioeconomic 
advancement. Lacking in resources – financial and otherwise, individuals and 
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households cannot become footloose and mobile enough to be able to seek opportunities 
by moving around. As sites of permanent migration, these cities cannot deflect the 
problems of poverty, inequality, and exclusion by expelling migrants. Of course, further 
comparative research over a long period of time is needed to either confirm or refute 
this speculation.     
 Places like Guiyang are not the usual choice for studying migrants because their 
numbers are few compared to mega-cities. It is possible that there are different dynamics 
in play that have been missed. Earlier studies in Beijing and other cities of similar scale 
characterize migrants as largely non-permanent, well-connected to their rural origins 
(via landholdings, farm and business endeavors, and split household arrangements), 
ambitious for surplus economic gains, and intent on staying only for the sake of their 
“labor market and social futures” (Fan, 2011: p. 12). Indeed, many young people from 
those relatively well-off villages in Guizhou, where finishing junior high school is the 
norm, are working in coastal cities until their marriage, child and elderly care duties, 
retirement, or other economic opportunities bring them back. If they are unable to get 
their children in city public schools, enrolling them in rural schools in their home village 
is not the greatest tragedy. By contrast, those from the worse-off villages, having grown 
up with little to no access to even the most basic education, have much few options 
besides moving to the nearest large city and staying there for as long as possible. These 
people and their descendants are permanent city dwellers who would benefit immensely 
from even a little government assistance.  
 Based on the findings from mega-cities where a random sample likely contains 
more of the first kind of migrants, some scholars have concluded that China represents 
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a deviation from the permanent migration paradigm that explains urbanization in other 
countries without such a thing as the household registration system. Migrants “straddle 
and circulate between rural and urban areas” (Chen and Fan, 2016; p. 9) because without 
the ability to obtain hukou in large cities and incentive to obtain hukou in small and 
medium-sized cities, their rural hukou status is important as a safeguard (Chen and Fan, 
2016). For migrants with substantial rural connections, it makes sense to keep one foot 
in the countryside. The hesitation to commit wholly to living in the city is just what 
NUP was designed to address. This model of urbanization does not account for the 
experiences of the migrant families in Guiyang that I had the privilege to learn. Those 
people and their descendants are permanent city dwellers who are being overlooked in 
research and neglected in policy and planning. For this reason, I argue that just because 
Guiyang does not have as many people does not mean the stakes there are lower. If 
anything, there will be many more cities like it in the near future.  
China has always been a unique case in the human aspects of its urbanization 
policies. Not only does there exist an internal passport system that regulates population 
movement and legitimizes place-based exclusions, the state can implement and enforce 
it quite effectively. As a result, scholars have often used the term “incomplete” to 
describe the urbanization process, by which they mean either one or all of four 
observations or conditions: that rural migrants are 1) institutionally tied to villages via 
landholdings; 2) in the city temporarily with no intention of staying; 3) at constant risk 
of being forced out; 4) formally and legitimately denied the right to basic services while 
in the city. Through this dissertation research, however, the question of how unique 
China is needs to be revisited, because the case of Guizhou nullifies the first three 
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conditions: Migrants are landless and intent on staying; the government has no capacity 
to deny new entries or drive out existing residents. Even the fourth condition is 
becoming less valid as the hukou restrictions are increasingly subject to flexible 
enforcement. If the findings here are corroborated, the implication is that Chinese cities 
are more comparable to those in other developing countries that are experiencing rural-
urban migration and urban exclusion than commonly believed – especially at the 
household level.  
The limitations of this dissertation are mainly due to time and resource 
constraints in obtaining data. Using theoretical sampling of more interview participants 
based on place, migration trajectory, or occupational category could allow for more 
systematic comparison. Since migration spans multiple places, it would also have been 
worthwhile to trace back to the origins of the migrants I interviewed in Guiyang and 
find out if and why anyone stayed there. The practical difficulty is that those places are 
not easily accessible. 
Going forward, there are several productive paths to move this research along 
that I believe are the relevant and timely. First, given that new developments are such 
an important and pervasive component of China’s growth strategy, it is worth collecting 
systematic data on their impact, such as the number and kind of jobs generated, where 
the new workers come from, improvement (or the lack thereof) in social infrastructure, 
etc. My fieldwork in Guian New Area scratched the surface of some of these questions; 
with more investigation, this portion of the dissertation research could result in a whole 
separate project. These new developments often result in displacement and involuntary 
migration, which is another important but relatively under-studied topic. Among the 
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displaced population that could be of interest is the “reluctant” return migrants – people 
who have been forced to leave the eastern cities for their hometown as a result of recent 
wave of expulsions. So far what we have on these migrants are anecdotal accounts found 
in journalistic reports. Finally, if newer data is made available, one can investigate 
whether significant improvements in the geographical flexibility of social security and 
supply of affordable housing can make up for the shortcomings of the hukou system. In 
summary, a dynamic approach is needed to research China’s urbanization as it relates 
to rural-urban migration – collecting multi-year data to infer causality, prioritizing paths 
and trajectories over single sites to understand relations among places, and untangling 
the bureaucratic knots to examine the processes of policy formulation and 
implementation. 
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